|People v Canales|
|2013 NY Slip Op 06376|
|Decided on October 2, 2013|
|Appellate Division, Second Department|
|Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.|
|This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.|
Decided on October 2, 2013
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P.
DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO
SHERI S. ROMAN
SYLVIA O. HINDS-RADIX, JJ.
(Ind. No. 8406/07)
Tony Canales, appellant.
David Cooper, Brooklyn, N.Y., and Levitt & Kaizer, New York,
N.Y. (Richard Ware Levitt of counsel), for appellant (one brief
Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard
Joblove and Diane R. Eisner of
counsel), for respondent.
DECISION & ORDER
SKELOS, J.P., ANGIOLILLO, ROMAN and HINDS-RADIX, JJ., concur.
STRICKLAND, SUPERINTENDENT, FLORIDA STATE PRISON, ET AL.
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
"This Court has always insisted that the need for procedural safeguards is particularly great where life is at stake. Long before the Court established the right to counsel in all felony cases, Gideon v. Wainwright,372 U. S. 335 (1963), it recognized that right in capital cases, Powell v.Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 71-72 (1932). Time 705*705 and again the Court has condemned procedures in capital cases that might be completely acceptable in an ordinary case. See, e. g., Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625 (1980); Green v.Georgia, 442 U. S. 95 (1979) (per curiam); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976). . . .
"Because of th[e] basic difference between the death penalty and all other punishments, this Court has consistently recognized that there is `a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.' Ibid."Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 913-914 (1983) (dissenting opinion).
"[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Woodson v. North Carolina,428 U. S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).