US Attorney Preet Bharara Decides Not To Indict NY State Governor Andrew Cuomo For Judicial Corruption

US Attorney Preet Bharara

No one is happy with Mr. Bharara's decision not to indict Governor Cuomo for closing down the Moreland Commission. no one.

Betsy Combier

Editor, New York Court Corruption

Bharara ends probe of Cuomo’s Moreland Commission shutdown

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After more than 17 months, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara has ended his investigation into Gov. Andrew Cuomo’s abrupt shuttering of a Moreland Commission probe in Albany.

In a statement, Bharara said that while the closing of the commission was “premature,” “absent any additional proof that may develop, there is insufficient evidence to prove a federal crime.”

“We continue to have active investigations related to substantive inquiries that were being conducted by the Moreland Commission at the time of its closure,” Bharara said.

The announcement, coming on the heels of a high-profile visit to discuss corruption issues with Kentucky lawmakers and the recent convictions of two of the state’s top legislative leaders, came seemingly without warning from Bharara’s office. The news effectively blows away a cloud of suspicion hanging over the state Capitol since Bharara’s office announced it was investigating the shutdown of the Moreland Commission in July, 2014.

Investigation Into Closing of N.Y.’s Moreland Commission Finds ‘Insufficient Evidence’ of Crime

Gov. Andrew Cuomo disbanded the anticorruption panel in 2014, although it hadn’t completed its investigations

ERICA ORDEN

Jan. 11, 2016 1:28 p.m. ETLINK

ALBANY, N.Y.—A 20-month investigation into the Cuomo administration’s handling of an anticorruption commission found “insufficient evidence to prove a federal crime,” Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara said Monday.

The determination, announced in a statement by the federal prosecutor, brings an end to an episode that has dogged Gov. Andrew Cuomo for nearly two years.

Mr. Bharara said the calculation had been made “after a thorough investigation of interference with the operation of the Moreland Commission and its premature closing.” Among other issues, the U.S. attorney’s office had been exploring whether actions taken by the governor’s office constituted witness tampering or obstruction of justice.

Elkan Abramowitz, an attorney for Mr. Cuomo and the executive chamber, said Monday “we were always confident there was no illegality here, and we appreciate the U.S. attorney clarifying this for the public record.”

Mr. Bharara’s statement was in part a response to speculation by lawmakers and the media about possible imminent charges against Mr. Cuomo in the Moreland matter, a person familiar with the matter said.

The Manhattan U.S. attorney’s office, however, has rarely issued such statements.

In November 2008, then-U.S. Attorney Michael Garcia said the office wouldn’t seek criminal charges against former New York Gov. Eliot Spitzer, who left office earlier that year amid a prostitution scandal.

Prosecutors’ decision to publicly absolve Mr. Cuomo concludes a chapter of his political career that threatened to overshadow much of his legislative work.

Mr. Cuomo, a Democrat, abruptly disbanded the anticorruption panel in April 2014, after nine months, in a deal with legislative leaders that resulted in additional ethics rules in Albany.

At the time, the commission hadn’t completed its investigations—its findings turned up evidence of criminal wrongdoing by at least 10 to 12 lawmakers, The Wall Street Journal reported—and Mr. Cuomo and his top aides had been accused of interfering in its efforts.

In the days following its disbanding, Mr. Bharara criticized the commission’s demise, saying it appeared as though “investigations potentially significant to the public interest have been bargained away.” He dispatched trucks to pick up investigative files from the commission so federal prosecutors could determine whether and how to pursue any matters that had been under examination.

His office quickly expanded its sights, issuing subpoenas to the state’s ethics-enforcement agency, the Joint Commission on Public Ethics, as well as to the Moreland’s former chief counsel, among others. It also instructed state legislators to preserve all records and documents related to the panel.

Over that summer, several of Mr. Cuomo’s highest ranking aides at the time, including then-Secretary to the Governor Larry Schwartz and Counsel Mylan Denerstein, spoke to federal investigators. Months later, investigators also interviewed Mr. Cuomo’s longtime political enforcer Joseph Percoco, according to people familiar with the matter.

Mr. Cuomo promised his office would cooperate with the investigation and defended the commission’s work, saying his aides offered advice to investigators but the panel operated with “total independence.”

Still, the matter became a significant political crisis for Mr. Cuomo, putting him on the defensive as he sought re-election and undermining claims he had made, even before he took office, that he would clean up Albany.

Meanwhile, the U.S. attorney’s other public-corruption prosecutions have prompted the ouster and conviction of two of the most powerful men in state politics: one-time legislative leaders Sheldon Silver and Dean Skelos.

Those convictions have spurred Mr. Cuomo to declare that he will, once again, propose ethics overhauls in his State of the State address on Wednesday.

On Monday, Mr. Bharara added that his office is continuing to pursue investigations of Albany lawmakers that it launched as a result of the files it picked up when it took over the Moreland Commission’s work.

And despite a sense of relief regarding the end of the Moreland matter, Mr. Cuomo’s administration can’t close the book on Mr. Bharara’s probes quite yet: Federal prosecutors are investigating the bidding process in an upstate revitalization projectchampioned by the governor.

—Rebecca Davis O’Brien contributed to this article.

THE DEATH OF SUNNY SHEU: UPDATE

Sunny Sheu

THE NYC DEPARTMENT OF INVESTIGATION, NYPD INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND THE NYPD DETECTIVE BUREAU CONTINUE THE COVER UP

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Pre-Publication Fact Check Request to Mayor De Blasio, DOI Commissioner Mark Peters, and Inspector General Philip Eure

After Sunny Sheu's death on June 26^th, 2010, the Blackstar News repeatedly sent certified letters informing Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly of the case and demanding an investigation.  Despite proof of receipt, none of these letters was ever acknowledged or responded to by Bloomberg or Kelly. Similar letters were sent to NYC Mayor Bill De Blasio and Commissioner William J. Bratton, which were likewise ignored.

The BSN letter ignored by the Mayor's office and NYPD Commissioners included allegations and evidence of many felonies by numerous agents of the NYPD - all relating to the death of Mr. Sheu - including illegal detention, illegal search and seizure, death threats, illegal removal of a body from a hospital, providing false evidence the Medical Examiner and potential complicity in a murder. Most significantly, the letter alerted the Mayor and Commissioner that the NYPD had failed to investigate a death ruled as “undetermined” by the Medical Examiner, as they are obligated to do.

By refusing to investigate thoroughly documented allegations of crimes by his subordinates, and failing to enforce laws violated by them, the NYPD Commissioner effectively became complicit in these acts, establishing them as systemic corruption in the NYPD.

NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF INVESTIGATION: “NEW YORK CITY'S WATCHDOG”
In either case; that of corruption of individual city employees, or systemic corruption in a government agency, the “watchdog agency” over corruption in the New York City government is the NY Department of Investigation (DOI).  According to their website: “[DOI] Investigations may involve any agency, officer, elected official or employee of the City... As New York City's watchdog, DOI's strategy attacks corruption comprehensively through systemic investigations that lead to high-impact arrests, preventive controls and operational reforms that improve the way the City runs.”

So it was the DOI that the BSN contacted in May 2014, to report corruption by NYPD officers, and systemic corruption in the NYPD as an institution. BSN's initial contact at the DOI was Lee Contes, Assistant to DOI Chief Investigator John Kantor. [Kantor was also known as “Assistant Commissioner” of the DOI] In an email to Contes of May 12, 2014, the BSN described the mortgage fraud, illegal detention and death threats by NYPD Detectives, Sheu's suspicious death and the ongoing cover up. A follow up letter, dated May 16, stressed that the complaint was against the NYPD, and further enumerated the specific complaints against the NYPD.

Contes replied that he would forward the case to DOI Chief of Investigations, John Kantor and that we would be hearing back from Kantor “within a day or two”.  Interestingly, Kantor formerly held a high-level position at the famously corrupt NY Department of Buildings during the period when Judge Golia's brother, James Golia, was the Assistant Commissioner.   

Three weeks passed and Kantor never responded. On May 30^th, the BSN wrote directly to Kantor, making it clear that if we did not hear from him by the end of the day, we would be reporting the case, and the DOI's delinquency, to Mayor De Blasio.
DOI CHIEF OF INVESTIGATIONS JOHN KANTOR TRANSFERS THE CASE TO EDDIE LEBRON OF THE NYPD / DOI SQUAD

Kantor responded the same day, confirming receipt of the email to Contes, and promising to review the complaint. The following Monday, Kantor confirmed that the DOI had initiated an investigation: “DOI has thoroughly reviewed the information that you have provided to Mr. Contes as well as the further information that is available on your website regarding the death of Mr. Sheu...Going forward, your contact should be Detective Eddie Lebron of DOI’s NYPD Squad.”

Immediately thereafter, Galison contacted Lebron by phone and then by email, and requested that he and Milton Allimadi, two of the primary sources in the Sheu case, and the possessors of key documentation, be interviewed in person by Lebron.

DETECTIVE EDDIE LEBRON OF THE NYPD/DOI SQUAD CONFIRMS THAT THE DOI IS INVESTIGATING THE CASE

Lebron Contacted the BSN on June 12^th, confirming that a DOI investigation of the Sheu case was underway: “The NYC Department of Investigation ( DOI ) is currently conducting an investigation into this matter. I am not able to meet with you in person at this time. I understand your desire to assist in this process but certain investigative steps must be completed, before anyone at DOI speaks with you. Please feel free to call me or correspond by email with any documentation or information that could assist in this investigation.”

BSN received no further communication from the DOI or the NYPD/DOI Squad after this letter. No requests for information, no updates, and no invitation to an interview. In fact, the DOI failed to respond to numerous emails sent to them by the BSN requesting a follow up report.

BSN tried many times to contact Lebron at the NYPD/DOI Squad by phone but we either kept on hold indefinitely,  told we would be called back and then forgotten. When BSN finally managed to connect with Lebron, on July 1, 2014, he refused to provide any information about the status of the case, but confirmed 13 times in that conversation that the DOI was investigating the case, and that he was the sole contact person for the Blackstar News. In our final conversation, Lebron assured the BSN that we would be contacted after certain preliminary steps were taken, but we were never contacted again.

“THE NYPD DOI SQUAD” IS NOT PART OF THE DOI AND IS FORBIDDEN FROM INVESTIGATING THE NYPD OR AIDING THE OIG/NYPD. THEIR “INVESTIGATION” WAS A FRAUD.

There is a very good reason why the NYPD/DOI Squad never got back to BSN. It turns out that the NYPD/DOI Squad is simply an NYPD detective squad, and as such has no jurisdiction over cases involving misconduct or criminality by NYPD personnel. The only agencies in the NYPD with such jurisdiction are the Bureau of Internal Affairs (IAB) and the Chief of Detective's Bureau

The Role of the NYPD/DOI Squad

The sole function of the NYPD/DOI Squad is to aid investigations at the request of one of the various Inspector Generals within the DOI, except for Office of Inspector General for NYPD Affairs, OIG/NYPD, whom they are expressly prohibited to assist, due to obvious conflict of interest. A detective from the NYPD/DOI Squad who requested anonymity stated: “We have nothing to do the OIG/NYPD part of it.. apparently they investigate us, the NYPD, I guess policies and procedures and stuff like that. So we don't work with them, because basically they're investigating us”.

 Thomas Mahoney, Chief of investigations for the Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD also confirmed this, stating: “the DOI/NYPD never handled complaints about the police department”.THE NYPD/DOI  SQUAD “INVESTIGATION” CITED BY LEBRON NEVER HAPPENED
As explained, the NYPD/DOI Squad is not part of the DOI. The only Inspector General in the DOI authorized to investigate the NYPD is the OIG/NYPD, which confirmed that they had no knowledge of the Sheu case before July 19, 2014. So Lebron's statement of June 12, that the “The NYC Department of Investigation ( DOI ) is currently conducting an investigation” is patently false.  There was no investigation by the DOI; and all of Lebron's communications with the BSN were fraudulent, intended only to mislead the BSN into believing that the Sheu case was being investigated, when it was not; by anybody.

KANTOR ALSO LIED ABOUT THE DOI/NYPD SQUAD “INVESTIGATION”
On June 30, 2014, Kantor wrote: “DOI is continuing to obtain relevant records regarding Mr. Sheu’s death from several agencies. We have received some of the requested records, but we need to obtain further records


UPDATE: DOI CONFIRMS THAT NEITHER THE DOI NOR THE NYPD/DOI SQUAD EVER INVESTIGAED THE SHEU CASE
On December 22, 2015 the BSN filed a FOIL request with the DOI, demanding:
1) All documents pertaining in any way to the “review” mentioned by John Kantor in his email of June 30^th, 2014, including the “original documentation regarding Mr. Sheu’s death...” and

2) All documents pertaining in any way to the “investigation” by The NYC Department of Investigation mentioned in the below e-mail from Detective Lebron, including the investigation, number, status of case and names of the investigators involved”
In her response of December 29, 2015, Elyse Hirschorn, Chief Investigative Attorney for the DOI wrote: “Neither the Department of Investigation nor the [NYPD] Department of Investigation Squad ever investigated this matter.”
Hirschorn then attempted to bend the truth by continuing: “Rather, the issues you raised were forwarded to the Inspector General for the New York Police Department (“OIG/NYPD”) for appropriate action.”
In fact, neither DOI nor the NYPD/DOI transferred the case to the OIG. As explained below, the Sheu complaint was introduced to the OIG by the Blackstar News in a letter of July 19, 2014, and Inspector General Philip Eure and his deputy Sandra Musemeschi, both stated that they had never heard of the case or the name Sunny Sheu before being notified by the BSN.
KANTOR TRANSFERRED THE SHEU CASE TO AN AGENCY WITH NO JURISDICTION, AND BURIED IT.
DOI Assistant Commissioner Jon Kantor knew that the NYPD/DOI Squad is not part of the DOI and that it is forbidden from investigating on behalf of the NYPD/DOI.  Therefore; when he gave the case to the NYPD/DOI Squad, he was knowingly giving the case to an agency without jurisdiction, and removing it from the DOI's legitimate jurisdiction. He buried it.

KANTOR CONCEALED THE COMPLAINT FROM THE SOLE AGENCY WITH JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE; THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL/ NYPD.
Had the Sunny Sheu complaint arrived at Kantor's desk before March 28, 2014, they may have had reason to refer the complaint to the NYPD, but only to the IAB or Detective's Squad, which were at that time the only city agencies with jurisdiction over NYPD misconduct. On that date however, in the wake of the IAB's mishandling of the Eric Garner scandal and amid great fanfare, Mayor De Blasio created a new agency within the DOI, specifically to investigate NYPD improprieties; the Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD (OIG/NYPD). After the creation of the OIG/NYPD, on May 28, 2014, any complaint to the DOI regarding the NYPD was referred directly to the OIG/NYPD.

On July 2, 2014. the BSN called the DOI for an update, and asked to speak to Lebron at the NYPD/DOI squad. The receptionist asked what the call regarded, and when told that it was a complaint against the NYPD, she responded: “the NYPD/DOI squad does not investigate complaints against the NYPD... that kind of thing is handled by the Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD”. Despite the BSN's insistence that the case had been investigated by the DOI/NYPD squad for over a month, the receptionist connected us to the OIG/NYPD.

Thus, after nearly two months of communication with the DOI, this receptionist was the first person at the DOI to mention the existence of the OIG to the BSN.

The BSN immediately wrote to Lebron, Kantor and Contes, demanding an explanation of why our complaint had been withheld from the OIG, and asking: “Have you or Mr. Kantor brought the Sunny Sheu case to the attention of Mr. Eure? ...” Lebron, Kantor and Contes never responded to this letter, and the BSN never heard from them again.

BSN Submits the Case to the Office Of The Inspector General for NYPD Affairs, Who Had Never Heard of the Case Previously
On July 19, 2014, the Blackstar News filed a formal complaint with the Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) This was in the form of a certified letter directly addressed to Philip Eure, the Inspector General for NYPD Affairs (“OIG/NYPD”) and his deputy, Sandra Musumechi, both of whom confirmed receipt.
Musumechi and Eure both stated, on the record, that prior to receiving the July 19^, letter, the OIG/NYPD had never received any information about the Sunny Sheu case, had never heard the name, and had never been contacted about it by NY DOI NYPD Squad. This confirms unequivocally that Lebron and the NYPD/DOI Squad had concealed the case and their “investigation” entirely from the OIG.

Eure Is Told of the Cover Up by the NYPD DOI Squad
The July 19, 2014 letter to Eure discussed not only the circumstances of Sheu's death and the ensuing cover up. It also emphasized the cover up by Lebron and the NYPD/DOI Squad, which, being part of the NYPD, is firmly under the OIG's jurisdiction.

Inspector General Philip Eure Continues the Cover Up.
When Inspector General Philip Eure was personally selected by DOI Commissioner Mark Peters to lead the Office of the Inspector General for NYPD, he was advertised as an  independent “outsider” with no loyalties to the NYPD, who would sweep the department clean without regard for entrenched power. Mayor De Blasio called Eure “One of the nation's premiere police accountability experts”.
The July 19 letter informs Eure, that a case involving possible complicity by the NYPD in a murder, which has been covered upby the NYPD, had been hijacked, buried and concealed from his agency by a corrupt NYPD agency (the NYPD/DOI), operating out of the very same building in which Eure was fighting NYPD corruption

Did Eure demand an investigation of the NYPD/DOI's role in covering up the case? Remarkably, Eure never responded to the July 19, 2014 letter, nor did he request any emails, phone recordings and other documentation of the NYPD/DOI’s phony investigation.  Indeed, to our knowledge, no branch of the DOI or any other law enforcement agency has ever investigated the cover up of the Sunny Sheu case by the NYPD/DOI Squad.

After many insistent follow up emails and calls by the BSN, however, Thomas Mahoney, Chief Investigator the Inspector General's office finally spoke to the BSN about the Sunny Sheu case, and finally consented to interview BSN Publisher Allimadi and reporter Galison.

The Office of the Inspector General Interviews Galison and Allimadi
On January 16th, at the DOI Headquarters, BSN met with OIG Investigator Edward Sanchez and Chief Investigator Joe Carhina. From the outset, it was clear that this would be “good cop/ bad cop” scenario, with Sanchez being obsequious to the point of annoyance, and Carinha being rude and dismissive to the point of aggression. Carinha even implied that Sheu had brought the illegal detention and death threats upon himself, by placing a note in the Judge's mailbox. with no concern for the raft of illegal acts involved with his detention and interrogation, not to mention his eventual death and the ensuing cover up
The BSN came prepared to answer questions clarifying and expanding upon on the evidence provided in the July 19  and accompanying documents.  For example, Allimadi was expecting to be asked to present his testimony that Dr. Ahmed had told him that “foul play” was involved in Sunny Sheu's death.  Allimadi's account is critically important to the case; if Ahmed was coerced into lying about the head trauma, then the people who coerced him were powerful enough to compel a doctor into committing a felony (accessory to murder after the fact), and interested in protecting the perpetrators.  Ahmed's confession of “foul play” is the key to the entire case, and should be of utmost concern to any honest investigator.

But Allimadi's account was immediately dismissed by the investigators as irrelevant. When Allimadi offered to sign a sworn affidavit and take a polygraph test to confirm his statement, Carinha objected that “lie detector tests are not allowed as evidence in a trial”.  The investigators ignored the fact that sworn affidavits are often presented as evidence in criminal cases, and a voluntary lie detector test may be certainly used as a basis for suspicion. Finally, when Galison asked if Ahmed would be questioned at all, Carinha replied “only if he chooses to come in...we can't force him”.
The OIG Neglects to Investigate The Key Questions of the Case

During the interview, in fact, neither Sanchez nor Carinha asked Allimadi or Galison a single question regarding the case. The only questions were asked by Allimadi and Galison, and while all the answers were vague and evasive, some revealed important clues as to the nature of the OIG's “investigation”, specifically, that the OIG:

- never subpoenaed the CAT scans made by ER Doctor Zeeshan Ahmed, who falsely told Sunny's friends and the NYPD that they showed no indication of head trauma. If the CAT scans showed unmistakable fractures to Sheu's skull (which they must), this would indicate that Ahmed knowingly allowed him to die without proper treatment.

- never investigated the disposition of Sheu's computer after his death or even inquired about its whereabouts. The computer would hold evidence of the NYPD's illegal surveillance of Sheu and hacking of his emails before his murder, which Sheu reported to the BSN and, under oath, to the FBI.

- never interviewed Dr. Zeeshan Ahmed, the ER Doctor who concealed Sheu's fatal head trauma and admitted to Allimadi that “foul play” was involved in Sheu’s death.

- never investigated the identity of the “witness” that the NYPD, in a fraudulent  memo, told the M.E. had seen Sheu fall, whose existence would exonerate the NYPD and whose non- existence would prove an NYPD conspiracy to mislead the M.E.
When reminded that all the 911 witnesses mentioned a man lying in the street and none mentioned a man falling down, Carhina replied: “Just because what you hear on 911, doesn't mean that later on when somebody was interviewed, that they may not add a little bit more...”
When reminded that there was no documentation of any interview with this alleged witness, no mention in the responding officer's notebook, no DD5, in fact none of the many mandatory official documents reflecting the existence of an interview, and that both Queens Assistant District Laura Weinstock and 109^th Pct. Detective Ardisano had told the BSN that there was no witness, Carinha replied: “Well, you just said that [the NYPD] sent something to the M.E's office so there is something in writing that said that somebody saw him fall, so something is in writing, right?” In other words, according to Carhina's logic, the NYPD memo mentioning the witness must be true simply because the memo existed.

– never investigated the fraudulent “investigation” by their colleagues at the DOI/NYPD, Squad, or the DOI's attempt to hijack the case from the OIG and bury it.

- never investigated the NYPD’s failure to investigate a death ruled as “undetermined” by the Medical Examiner.
DOI Chief Investigator Finds “Nothing Suspicious About the Sunny Sheu Case”

At the conclusion of the forty-five minute interview, Allimadi cut to the chase by asking Carinha a simple question: “Do you see [anything in the Sunny Sheu case] that looks suspicious?” to which Carinha answered without hesitation: “No”.

SHEU HAD “LOTS OF INJURIES; NOT JUST TO HIS HEAD”: MEDICAL EXAMINER

Despite the investigators' efforts to be opaque, Sanchez let slip one fact of great significance. He stated that he interviewed Dr. Michael Greenberg, the Medical Examiner who autopsied Sheu's body and subpoenaed his medical records, and according to Sanchez “[the Medical Examiner] determined that there was lots of injuries - not just to the head - and the matter was undetermined”. This is a bombshell: how could Sheu have sustained lots of his injuries to different parts of his body, simply by falling over and hitting his head? “Lots of injuries” is consistent with a man fighting for his life, not with a man having a seizure and falling straight down on the ground and into a coma. It also re-emphasizes the question of why Dr. Ahmed, who examined Sheu thoroughly in the hours before his death, told Sheu's friends that Sheu suffered no external injuries at all. How could Ahmed, in the course of four hours of intensive life saving procedures, have failed to notice significant injuries all over Sheu's body, in addition to the fatal “trauma to the head with multiple skull fractures and brain injuries”?

BSN LETTER TO OIG CHEIF INVESTIGATOR THOMAS MAHONEY RE: CARHINA
On January 18, 2015 the BSN wrote a letter to OIG Chief Inspector Thomas Mahoney - once again sent by certified mail and copied to Philip Eure, Mark Peters and Mayor De Blasio - entitled “ Profound Concerns Regarding Your Senior Investigator, Joseph Carinha”, and expressing the BSN's outrage over the bias and ignorance of the OIG Investigator. The BSN has never received a response from Mahoney, Eure, Peters or Mayor De Blasio.

THE OIG'S VIOLATION OF NY FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW.
Stonewalled by a total blackout of communication from the OIG, the BSN decided to request documents from them through the NY State Freedom of information law (FOIL). If the OIG had done any investigation on the case at all, we reasoned, they would have had to have subpoenaed, at the bare minimum:

- The name of the party that ordered the detention of Sunny Sheu in January 2009
- The records of the “interview” of Sheu by the Detectives who detained him
- The party that ordered the removal of Sheu's body from the Queens Hospital
- The police officers who removed Sheu's body from the Queens Hospital
- The name of the alleged “witness” who allegedly saw Sheu collapse
- Any NYPD paperwork the “interview” in which an alleged witness said he saw Sheu collapse
- The NYPD documents reflecting the false cause and false manner of Sheu's death, as cited by Detective Ardisano.
Under FOIL law, the OIG would, at the very least, be required to state whether each individual requested document was in their possession, if they were available to the public or not, and if not, precisely why not. Of course, according to the NYPD, and to OIG there was no crime and no evidence of a crime, and thus no investigation. So what could be the basis on which to keep any documents secret?
On January 19, 2015, the BSN sent a request for documents to the FOIL officer at the OIG, Assim Rehman, who is also the OIG's legal council. The request was unambiguous. It asked for “all documents” pertaining to 24 separate and distinct documents, relating to the death of Sunny Sheu and its cover up by the NYPD.

Under FOIL law - by default - every document generated by the government must be made available to the public, exceptdocuments which may be withheld or redacted because they fall under specific “exceptions” which are detailed in the FOIL law.

The response of Rehman was to utterly ignore the rules and precedent of FOIL case law. Rehman not only refused to provide a single document requested; he failed to specify the exception for each requested, illegally grouped all of the 24 demands together and denied them all in one sentence: “Any material which may be in the possession of this department that would be responsive to your request would be exempt from disclosure would interfere with law enforcement investigations”.

By this meticulously evasive wording, Rehman tried to skirt the pertinent question of which documents the OIG possessed, so that it could not be determined whether the OIG had actually investigated the case or not

WHY THE SUNNY SHEU CASE IS “SYSTEMIC”
Though it may seem a matter of semantics, the question of whether the BSN complaints to the DOI represent “systemic”problems with the NYPD or not, is the key to their jurisdiction. According to the OIG website, cases deemed “systemic” or regarding “policy or procedure” are under the unique jurisdiction of the OIG, and those considered “complaints against individual officers”, are under the jurisdiction of the NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB).

At the very least, the illegal detention of Sheu by NYPD Detectives, during which Sheu alleged that he was abducted against his will, his wallet confiscated, his documents photocopied and that he was threatened with death, is the ultimate example of “stop and frisk”; one of the “systemic” issues that the OIG is specifically mandated to investigate. 

But it is the failure of the Police Commissioner to order an investigation of a death ruled as undetermined by the M.E. that makes this case “systemic” prima face. The decision to not investigate a death ruled “undetermined” cannot possibly be the act of an individual officer, especially when two consecutive NYPD Commissioners were informed of the M.E's ruling and specifically told that they must investigate under law. The decision to not investigate a death ruled “undetermined” they depend on the police to investigate by the Medical Examiner, is a matter of “policy and procedure”, and a crime.

According to John Fudenberg, former President of the International Association of Coroners and Medical Examiners, “If a Medical Examiner has a case of “blunt force Trauma to the head, and they can’t tell if it’s a from a strike or a fall, they should and do depend on the police to attempt to get them more information… Homicide Detectives and Medical Legal Professionals are trained to treat every death as a homicide until they can prove otherwise, but especially if there is any indication that it might have actually been a homicide”.

THE OIG REFERS THE CASE TO THE NYPD INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUREAU, BUT WITHOLDS CRITICAL INFORMATION FROM THEM

A letter dated April 14th, 2015 from Thomas Mahoney of the OIG, states: “We have completed our preliminary investigation of your complaint... With respect to your specific concerns regarding the death of Mr. Sheu... Given the content of your July 23^rd[sic] complaint [originally sent to Eure on July 19, and dated as such] , we believe that the NYPD internal affairs Bureau (IAB) would be an appropriate investigative agency... therefore we will forward IAB a copy of your complaint so that they may review the matter further”.
Mahoney's letter certainly implies that it was the July 19 complaint that was sent to the IAB for further review, but incredibly, according to a source at the IAB, the “complaint” that the OIG sent them was not the July 19 complaint. Our source, who examined the entire file transferred from the OIG reported that the only document provided to the IAB by the OIG was the May 12 letter to Contes. He stated: “... April 8^th, that's when they sent the letter.... The only [complaint] they sent was [the email from] May 12^th, it was basically your correspondence with Mr. Contes. That's it'. He further confirmed that the July 19 letter was not provided by the OIG. This sleight of hand by Mahoney raises the question of whether the May 12^th letter may have been altered.

Why did Mahoney send the wrong letter to the IAB and lie about it to the BSN? Perhaps because the difference between the May 12 letter and the July 19 letter is critical to the jurisdiction of the case. The hijacking and burying of the case by the DOI/NYPD squad is detailed in the July letter but absent in the May letter, because it had not yet occurred . The OIG/NYPD Squad's fraudulent “investigation” not only adds to the long list of NYPD officers complicit in the cover up, it further establishes that the case is systemic, and therefore under the exclusive jurisdiction of the OIG.

And of course, leaving out the documented allegations against the NYPD/DOI gets the OIG's office mates at the NYPD/DOI off the hook, which may have been another intention.

ACCORDING TO THE IAB, THE OIG DID “NO INVESTIGATION” ON THE CASE BEFORE TRANSFERRING IT TO THEM.

Our source at the IAB also revealed that the dossier sent to the IAB by the OIG indicated that the OIG had done no investigation on the case, because no results of any investigation were included in the dossier. “I don't think [the OIG] did any investigation into it” she noted.

This means that either the OIG did no investigation whatsoever on the case, or they withheld the results of their investigationfrom the IAB when they transferred the case to them. If they did no investigation, then on what basis did Rehman deny the FOIL requests based on “an ongoing law enforcement investigation”? And what were they doing for the nine months between receiving the complaint in July and sending to the IAB in April?

Of course we know that Sanchez learned from the Medical Examiner that Sheu had suffered “lots of wounds” all over his body, and that this important fact was never provided to the IAB. What other findings of the nine-month OIG/NYPD “investigation” were concealed from the IAB?
NYPP INTERNAL AFFAIRS SITS ON THE CASE FOR SIX MONTHS WITH NO INVESTIGATAION, THEN TRANFERS IT TO THE DETECTIVE BUREAU WHICH CLOSE IT IN A WEEK. 
The NYPD IAB held the case for six months, and conducted no investigation, according to our source. On September 19, 2015, the IAB transferred the case to the NYPD Chief of Detectives Bureau. The sole detective delegated to investigate the case was Sgt. Anthony Bocola, a veteran NYPD cop sued in 2001 for punching a 13 year old dance student in the face.

Bocola confirmed that neither the DOI, OIG nor the IAB had furnished him with any findings resulting from their respective investigations, and only furnished him with the original May 12. 2014 complaint to John Kantor. This means that Bocola had no knowledge of the complaint to Inspector General Philip Eure which included documentation of the fraudulent claims by the NYPD/DOI Squad that they had investigated the case.

The NYPD Detective Bureau's Investigation is Completed in Less than Eight Days.

Although Bocola refused to comment on his investigation of the Sunny Sheu case, one very important aspect is apparent; the “investigation” was astonishingly brief.  Bocola received the complaint on September 19, 2015. Bocola's superior,  Lieutenant Simmons, refused to give a specific date for the closing of the case, but he told the BSN “it was closed in September of this year”.

Since September has only 30 days, this means that Bocola's investigation of the illegal detention/kidnapping, the death threats, the false statements of Dr. Ahmed, the unauthorized removal of the body by NYPD Detectives, the false witness” story sent to the Medical Examiner by Austin and Grant, the false reports given by Ardisano about the cause and manner of death, the unauthorized cremation of the body by a party falsely claiming to be the Executor of Sheu's estate, the violation of FOIL law by the NYPD and above all, the NYPD's failure to investigate a case ruled “undetermined” by the Medical Examiner for over five and a half years, was conducted in the maximum of one week.

Bocola Investigate and Closed the Case Without Interviewing Any of the Primary Witnesses, or Examining Any Evidence

Moreover, Bocola managed to complete the “investigation” without interviewing any witnesses or requesting any information from the BSN. In fact the BSN was never even told that the Case had been transferred to the CDB or that the case had been closed. BSN only found this out through our source at the IAB, two months after the fact.

The only positive thing that can be said about Bocola is that it only took him just eight to do exactly what it took the DOI, OIG and IAB 15 months months to do, namely to conduct a sham investigation, with the intention of covering up the circumstances of the Sunny Sheu case.

The Unbelievable Story Of The Queens Man Who Fought Foreclosure And Wound Up Dead

Sunny Sheu

Business Insider

LINK

The death of Queens judicial activist Sunny Sheu is the subject of a chilling investigation in the New York investigative newspaper Black Star News.

Here's a quick recap.

On a calm spring afternoon eleven years ago, Sunny Sheu's lunch was interrupted by a knock on his front door. It was Tower Insurance agent, there to inspect the home for its new owners.

Surprised, Sheu explained his home hadn't been for sale, but Tower's paperwork was official. "I almost choked on my soup," he told Black Star News in 2009 (via Zero Hedge).

The Queens resident had been victim of a complex scam that started with a forged power of attorney and led to a mortgage with Centex Home Equity. The story ended with his death from blunt force trauma to the head almost one year ago today.

Sheu refinanced his house in his brother's name in 2000. Sheu's mortgage broker, Roman Chiu then forged Sheu's brother's signature on a power of attorney and received a mortgage from Centex for Sheu's home.

After alerting the police, the bank that held the mortgage, and the title insurer, Sheu gathered together the forged paperwork, and the parties responsible were arrested and sent to jail. 

Sheu assumed that would be the end of it, but Centex--the issuer of the bogus mortgage--ignored the police reports as well as the evidence and foreclosed on the house.

The foreclosure sale occurred January 28, 2005.

“Centex bought the property for $1,000 from Amy Cheng, the fraudster,” Sheu said to Black Star. “That was not even her real name. How can you buy property from someone who does not exist?”

Finally, the case was assigned to Justice Joseph Golia in the State Supreme Court of Queens. Although extensive documentation had been enough to send the forgers to jail, Judge Golia said the assertion that the fraud occurred was "misleading and disingenuous at best.”

Following this ruling, Sheu began his own investigation. He found a list of Golia's properties and went to the OCA Ethics Department to check the list against the judge's financial disclosure forms.

According to Sheu, he found major discrepancies, including a $1 million beach home on Breezy Point Long Island. Judge Golia did not return phone calls from Black Star seeking comment on this matter. He also did not return a call fromBusiness Insider.  

Sheu's allegations were enough to get the director of the OCA Ethics Department Janice Howard to ask Golia for an amended financial disclosure statement. A last chance to come clean.

When Sheu went to pick up his copy of the amended statement, he brought a friend with a video camera. When he saw the paper lacked all the property conflicts Sheu had found, he's recorded saying: "Now I've got him! I've got enough evidence to put Golia in Jail."

Understanding the seriousness of the allegations, Sheu finally recorded a video stating that if any harm came to him, investigators should look to Judge Golia. We have embedded that video below.

According to Sheu's death certificate, three days later that he was found dead from a severe blow to the skull. The death has been ruled an accident by the medical examiner and no investigation has been conducted.

Further questions were raised by Black Star News:

Sheu’s associates also question why NYPD officers removed Sheu's body from the Queens hospital, at 5 AM, hours after his death, and transferred it to the Medical Examiner, who was provided with a letter stating that "no criminality" was involved, all without even a cursory investigation.

At the same time, the precinct involved in the removal, the 109, insisted that Sheu had suffered "no head trauma", a position contradicted by the Medical Examiner, who concluded that Sheu died of "blunt force trauma to the head with skull fractures and brain injuries".

Darkening the story further is the improper treatment of Mr. Sheu’s body by the New York Queens Hospital and their false statements regarding his injuries. (The role of the New York Hospital of Queens in the disposition of Sheu’s body will be elucidated in part two of this series.)

Add the epilogue of the NYPD's refusal to release relevant documents requested by this newspaper under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)- and all the components of a deeply disturbing mystery are in place.

What happened to Sheu and the antagonism between him and Judge Golia may never be fully known, but Black Star's report raises serious questions about the judge's ruling and Sheu's death.

Sunny Sheu's video is below. The medical examiner's opinion is here. You can read another summary of the story here, and the whole story at Black Star News.

Attorney Ethics, Confidentiality and Discipline in New Jersey: R.M. and "Jane Doe"

R.M. v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, et al.

Annotate this Case

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
 

R.M. v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, et al. (A-89-04)
 
 
Argued May 2, 2005 -- Decided October 19, 2005

JUSTICE ZAZZALI writing for the Court.
 
In this matter, R.M. challenges the constitutionality of Supreme Court Rule 1:20-9, which mandates that an ethics grievance filed against an attorney remains confidential until a formal complaint is filed.

R.M. retained New Jersey attorney "Jane Doe" to represent her in a legal matter. She subsequently filed a grievance against Doe with the District XIII Ethics Committee (DEC). The grievance form cautioned R.M. that she had to keep all communications concerning the grievance confidential "until and unless a complaint is issued and served."

During the DEC's investigation, Doe admitted specific acts of misconduct in connection with her representation of R.M. Pursuant to established procedures, the DEC Chair reviewed the matter and determined that Doe was eligible for "diversion" because her ethical violations were minor and were not likely to result in a discipline greater than an admonition.

The DEC informed R.M. that although Doe had accepted diversion, the matter would remain confidential under Rule 1:20-9(a).

R.M. sued the Supreme Court, the Office of Attorney Ethics, the District XIII Ethics Committee, and "Jane Doe," alleging that the rule violates the free speech provisions of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions by restricting R.M.'s ability to discuss her grievance against Doe. R.M. indicated that if confidentiality were lifted, she would publicize the facts that she filed the grievance, that the Chair of the DEC concluded there was a reasonable prospect of finding Doe guilty of minor ethical misconduct, and that Doe had entered into a diversion agreement. In particular, R.M. seeks to announce this information at a public meeting of the governmental body on which Doe serves and at other public forums.

The Supreme Court certified the case directly to the Superior Court, Law Division, pursuant to Rule 2:12-1. Prior to hearing oral argument on the matter, the Court asked its Professional Responsibility Rules Committee (PRRC) to review the issues raised by the parties, solicit comments, and submit findings to the Court. The PRRC filed a report with the Court in which it recommended that investigations should remain confidential until completed. The PRRC also proposed that if the Court were to limit the scope of confidentiality, it should eliminate the existing absolute immunity for grievants.

HELD: As written and as applied, Rule 1:20-9 violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. A grievant may discuss publicly the fact that he or she has filed a grievance, the content of that grievance, and the result of the process. The Court's holding applies retroactively to all grievances currently being processed by the attorney disciplinary system. The confidentiality of concluded matters shall, however, remain in effect.

1. The overarching goal of the attorney disciplinary system is to protect the public from unfit lawyers and to promote public confidence in the legal system. A grievance is initially handled by the DEC Secretary. The Secretary dockets the grievance if the allegations, assuming they are true, amount to misconduct. Once docketed, the grievance is assigned to a member of the DEC for investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation, the member reports to the Chair of the DEC, who determines whether the DEC should either file a formal complaint against the respondent attorney or dismiss the matter. In addition, if the Chair were to determine that there is misconduct but that it would not result in a sanction greater than an admonition, the matter would qualify for "diversion." In such a case, the attorney would have to sign an agreement in lieu of discipline. Fulfillment of the terms of the agreement would result in the dismissal of the matter. If the attorney were to fail to comply with the agreement, the matter would proceed under a formal complaint for discipline.

Formal complaints are considered by three-member panels of the DEC. At least one member of each panel is a layperson. Each panel's hearings are public. If a panel recommends discipline, the matter is referred to the Director of the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) for transmittal to the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB). The DRB reviews all appeals and recommendations for discipline and conducts public hearings on the latter. It then files its determinations with the Supreme Court, which issues an Order to Show Cause in cases in which disbarment is recommended by the DRB. In all other cases, the Court may further review the matter or accept the DRB's decision as submitted. (pp. 5-8)

2. Supreme Court Rule 1:20-9 contains the confidentiality provisions for the attorney disciplinary system. Confidentiality applies, with certain enumerated exceptions, to all matters that have not reached the formal complaint stage. (pp. 8-9)

3. The United States Supreme Court has had many opportunities to review the concept of "free speech" under the First Amendment. To sustain a governmental proscription of the publication of truthful speech, the State has the burden of demonstrating that its action furthers a "compelling interest." Beyond that, the State also must show that the regulation is "narrowly tailored" to achieve its compelling interest. (pp. 10-11)

4. The State argues that maintaining confidentiality in attorney disciplinary proceedings prior to the issuance of a formal complaint furthers three compelling interests: 1) protecting the reputations of lawyers who are unfairly accused of wrongdoing; 2) encouraging attorneys who have committed minor misconduct to agree to diversion; and 3) preserving the integrity of the disciplinary system and its investigative process. After analyzing each of the arguments raised by the State, the Court has concluded that none of them presents "compelling interests" that are "narrowly tailored" for achievement. (pp. 17-28)

5. Although the Court's decision invalidates the confidentiality provisions of Rule 1:20-9, there are still means by which the disciplinary system can further an attorney's interest in confidentiality without violating the First Amendment: 1) A DEC can recommend that the grievant maintain confidentiality during the investigatory stage and the grievant can agree to do so when it is in his or her best interest; 2) There may be some disciplinary investigations in which the need for secrecy is paramount and the potential harm from premature disclosure is so great that on a showing of specific and articulable facts the investigator may have good cause to seek an order compelling the grievant to keep confidential the investigatory proceedings; and 3) Although grievants are absolutely immune from suit for filing an ethics grievance or making statements within the context of subsequent disciplinary proceedings, they are not immune for statements made outside the context of a disciplinary matter, such as to the media or in another public forum. Accordingly, grievants who falsely smear an attorney in public do so at their own peril and may face defamation actions in appropriate cases. (pp. 28-29)

6. On the subject of retroactivity of the new Rule, the Court finds that full retroactivity would impose an undue hardship on participants who justifiably relied on the old Rule. Although the preexisting confidentiality Rule shall remain in effect for concluded matters, a purely prospective application of the new Rule would unnecessarily inhibit otherwise free speech. Therefore, the Court holds that the new Rule shall have "pipeline" retroactivity. It shall apply to all future cases and to all matters that are now pending in the attorney disciplinary system. R.M. is entitled to the benefit of this ruling. She is permitted to discuss her grievance against Jane Doe, the subsequent ethics proceedings, and the outcome. (pp. 30-31)

7. A grievant may speak publicly regarding the fact that a grievance was filed, the content of that grievance, and the result of the process. The fact that a matter was subject to diversion is no longer confidential, but the contents of the diversion agreement are not to be disclosed. Documents that are gathered during the ethics proceedings are not to be released publicly by disciplinary officials except as provide by Rule 1:20-9(a), (i). The Court refers its opinion to the Professional Responsibility Rules Committee to draft appropriate Rule amendments. Until formal amendments have been drafted and approved, the Court's opinion shall serve as interim rules governing the questions of confidentiality addressed herein. (pp. 32-33)

The matter is REMANDED to the Professional Responsibility Rules Committee to draft implementing amendments to Rule 1:20-9.

CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ, filing a separate CONCURRING opinion in which JUSTICES LONG, ALBIN, and WALLACE join, notes that the question of immunity for grievants, raised by the Professional Responsibility Rules Committee in its report, is not properly before the Court. She believes that the rationale behind the Court's 1984 decision on grievant immunity -- that is, that immunity fosters public trust in our attorney disciplinary system and that it reduces concerns that "non-malicious potential complainants" may be deterred from filing grievances because of a fear of retaliation by the attorney -- is as valid today as it was in 1984. She sees no reason to seek further guidance from the PRRC.

JUSTICE ZAZZALI, filing a CONCURRING opinion in which JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and RIVERA-SOTO join, agrees that the immunity issue was not raised by the parties or by the Court in granting certification of the case. He would, however, remand the matter to the PRRC to provide a detailed basis for its recommendation that immunity be abrogated.

CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and ASSOCIATE JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE, and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI's opinion. On the issue of immunity for grievants, CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ has filed a separate CONCURRING opinion in which JUSTICES LONG, ALBIN, and WALLACE join, and JUSTICE ZAZZALI has filed a separate CONCURRING opinion in which JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and RIVERA-SOTO join. 

 

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A- 89 September Term 2004
 
 
R.M.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY, DISTRICT XIII ETHICS COMMITTEE and OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS,

Defendants-Respondents,

and

JANE DOE,

Defendant.

Argued May 2, 2005 Decided October 19, 2005

On certification to the Superior Court, Law Division, Mercer County.

Richard M. Gutman argued the cause for appellant.

Carol Johnston, Senior Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel).

Frederick J. Dennehy argued the cause for amicus curiae, New Jersey State Bar Association (Edwin J. McCreedy, President, attorney).

JUSTICE ZAZZALI delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this matter, R.M. challenges the constitutionality of Rule 1:20-9, which mandates that a grievance filed against an attorney remains confidential until a formal complaint is filed. She contends that the rule is an impermissible restraint on free speech because it prevents her from making truthful statements about the ethics process, including the fact that she filed a grievance. R.M. also argues that Rule 1:20-9 unduly suppresses criticism of the system of attorney discipline.
We agree that, as written and as applied, Rule 1:20-9 violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. We hold that a grievant may discuss publicly the fact that he or she filed a grievance, the content of that grievance, and the result of the process. Our holding applies retroactively to all grievances currently being processed by the disciplinary system. The confidentiality of concluded matters, however, shall remain in effect.

I.
Background
 
Plaintiff R.M. retained New Jersey attorney Jane Doe to represent her in a legal matter. R.M. subsequently filed a grievance against Doe with the District XIII Ethics Committee (District). The grievance form that R.M. submitted cautioned her that
[u]nder Supreme Court Rule 1:20-9(a), once you file this grievance form you are REQUIRED thereafter to keep all communications about this ethics matter CONFIDENTIAL during the investigation until and unless a complaint is issued and served. Only at that time does confidentiality end and the matter become public. This investigative confidentiality does not prevent you from discussing the facts underlying your grievance with, or reporting them to, any other person or agency. However, during the investigation you may not disclose the fact that you have filed an ethics grievance to persons other than members of the attorney disciplinary system, except to discuss the case with other witnesses or to consult an attorney.
During the District s investigation, Doe admitted specific acts of misconduct in connection with her representation of R.M. The District chair determined that Doe had committed minor ethical violations that would likely result in a public admonition and that Doe was therefore eligible for diversion. Diversion is a non-disciplinary treatment by consent for attorneys who admit they have committed minor unethical conduct. R. 1:20 (Official Glossary of Attorney Discipline Terms). The District then informed R.M. that, although Doe had accepted diversion, this matter remains confidential pursuant to . . . [Rule] 1:20-9(a). 
R.M. subsequently sued this Court, the District, the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE), and Jane Doe, alleging that Rule 1:20-9 violates the free speech provisions of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions by restricting R.M. s ability to discuss her grievance against Doe. R.M. has indicated that if confidentiality is lifted, she intends to publicize the fact that she filed the grievance, that the chair of the District determined that there was a reasonable prospect of a finding of misconduct by clear and convincing evidence, and that Doe admitted to minor unethical conduct and entered into a diversion agreement. In particular, R.M. seeks to announce this information at a public meeting of the governmental body on which Doe serves and in other public forums.
Pursuant to Rule 2:12-1, we certified this matter directly to determine whether Rule 1:20-9 is unconstitutional. The State, represented by the Attorney General, submitted a brief on behalf of the Court, the OAE, and the District. The New Jersey State Bar Association (NJSBA) participated as amicus curiae. During the pendency of the litigation, we requested that the Professional Responsibility Rules Committee (PRRC) review the issues raised by the parties, solicit comments from other interested persons and groups, and submit findings to the Court. The PRRC submitted a memorandum and summary letter, in which it recommended that investigations should remain confidential until completed. Although not part of the submission, PRRC also proposed that if the Court limits the scope of the confidentiality requirement, then the Court should eliminate absolute immunity for grievants.
II.
 
Before addressing the constitutionality of Rule 1:20-9, we begin with an overview of the attorney disciplinary system in New Jersey.
A.
General Attorney Discipline Procedures
 
This Court has both the authority and obligation to oversee the discipline of attorneys admitted to the New Jersey Bar. N.J. Const. art. 6, 2, 3; see also R. 1:20-1(a) ( Every [New Jersey] attorney . . . shall be subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. . . . ). We exercise our authority through the OAE, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB), the Disciplinary Oversight Committee, the District Ethics Committees, and the fee arbitration committees. R. 1:20-1(a). The overarching goal of the disciplinary system is to protect the public from unfit lawyers and promote public confidence in our legal system. In re Gallo, 178 N.J. 115, 122 (2003).
A grievance against an attorney is handled at the initial stage by a District Ethics Committee secretary. R. 1:20-3(d). The secretary must evaluate all information received by inquiry, grievance or from other sources alleging attorney unethical conduct or incapacity. R. 1:20-3(e)(1). The secretary dockets the grievance if the allegations, assuming they are true, amount to misconduct. Ibid. Once a matter is docketed, a member of a District Ethics Committee is assigned to investigate. R. 1:20-3(g)(1). At the conclusion of the initial investigation, the investigator must provide a written report, including a recommendation, to the chair of the District Ethics Committee. R. 1:20-3(h). The chair must then determine whether there is a reasonable prospect of a finding of unethical conduct by clear and convincing evidence. See footnote 1 R. 1:20-4(a); see also R. 1:20-3(h). If there is not, the matter is dismissed, and the facts and reasons for dismissal are provided to the respondent attorney, the grievant, and the Director of the OAE. R. 1:20-3(h). On the other hand, if the chair concludes that evidence supports a finding that the respondent attorney committed unethical conduct, then the chair must classify the attorney s actions as either minor unethical conduct or unethical conduct. R. 1:20-3(i)(1).
Minor unethical conduct involves actions by the respondent attorney that, if proven, would not warrant a sanction greater than a public admonition. R. 1:20-3(i)(2)(A). Upon such a finding, the District Ethics Committee chair may request that the OAE Director divert the matter and approve an agreement in lieu of discipline. R. 1:20-3(i)(2)(B)(iii). The agreement may impose certain conditions on the respondent attorney, including reimbursement of fees or costs, completion of legal work, participation in [an] alcohol or drug rehabilitation program, psychological counseling or satisfactory completion of a course of study. Ibid. Fulfillment of the terms of the agreement will result in dismissal of the ethics matter. Ibid. If the attorney fails to comply with the agreement, the matter will be reinstated and processed as unethical conduct. R. 1:20-3(i)(2)(C). The chair of the District Ethics Committee notifies the grievant that the matter has been diverted, and the grievant may submit comments to the Director. R. 1:20-3(i)(2)(B)(i). The existence and substance of the diversion agreement remain confidential. R. 1:20-9(a).
Unethical conduct involves a more serious breach of attorney ethics, such as when the respondent attorney commits a crime or an act involving dishonesty, fraud, or deceit; takes action that could result in substantial prejudice to a client or other person without restitution by the attorney; or knowingly misappropriates funds. R. 1:20-3(i)(2)(A). Unless the respondent attorney agrees to discipline by consent, a formal complaint is issued by either the District Ethics Committee or the OAE Director. R. 1:20-3(i)(3)(B); R. 1:20-4. A three-member panel then conducts public hearings, R. 1:20-6(a)(1), (c)(2)(F), after which the panel may dismiss the complaint, recommend an admonition, or recommend more severe discipline, R. 1:20-6(c)(2)(E). If the panel recommends discipline, the matter is referred to the OAE Director for transmittal to the DRB. R. 1:20-6(c)(2)(E)(ii), (iii). The DRB reviews any appeals and recommendations for discipline, R. 1:20-15(e), (f), and makes specific determinations on the appropriate sanctions to be imposed, including suspensions, censures, reprimands, and admonitions, R. 1:20-15A(a)(2) to (6). When the DRB concludes that disbarment is warranted, it must present the matter to the Supreme Court as a recommendation. R. 1:20-16(a). Finally, in addition to the consideration of recommendations for disbarment, the Court may review all other DRB determinations. R. 1:20-16(b).
B.
Confidentiality Under Rule 1:20-9
 
We now briefly summarize the confidentiality provisions at issue in this appeal. Rule 1:20-9 requires that all participants in a disciplinary proceeding, including disciplinary officials and employees, maintain the confidentiality of all grievances that do not result in the filing of formal complaints, including matters that are diverted or dismissed. R. 1:20-9(a), (h). There are five exceptions to the confidentiality rule: (1) the respondent attorney has waived or breached confidentiality; (2) the proceeding is based on allegations of reciprocal discipline, a pending criminal charge, or a guilty plea or conviction of a crime; (3) there is a need to notify a person or organization in order to protect the public, the administration of justice, or the legal profession; (4) this Court has granted an emergent disciplinary application for relief; or (5) the matter has become common knowledge to the public. R. 1:20-9(a)(1) to (5). The parties concede, and we agree, that none of these exceptions apply in this matter.
Rule 1:20-9(a) also mandates that all written records received and made pursuant to [the disciplinary] rules shall be confidential. The rules specify that public records of an attorney s discipline are to include a complaint, a motion for final or reciprocal discipline, or the approval of a motion for discipline by consent, as well as all documents and records filed subsequently. R. 1:20-9(c)(1). Those records are made available for public inspection once a formal complaint is filed against the respondent attorney. Ibid.
III.
 
With that summary of the attorney disciplinary process as our cynosure, we now examine First Amendment principles and case law that address the constitutionality of confidentiality rules in the context of professional disciplinary systems.
A.
 
The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. U.S. Const. amend. I. The Free Speech Clause is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811, 95 S. Ct. 2222, 2227, 44 L. Ed. 2d 600, 605 (1975); see also Township of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 176 (1999) (holding protections of New Jersey Constitution s free speech clause co-extensive with First Amendment). Far from safeguarding only profound statements on topics of great import, the First Amendment protects [a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1309, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498, 1507 (1957).
Although the protection of speech is not absolute, City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2132, 80 L. Ed. 2d 772, 791 (1984), laws that punish the dissemination of truthful information are generally presumed to be constitutionally infirm, Smith v. Daily Mail Publ g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102, 99 S. Ct. 2667, 2670, 61 L. Ed. 2d 399, 404 (1979). To sustain government proscription of the publication of truthful speech, the State has the burden of demonstrating that the law furthers a compelling interest. First Nat l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 1421, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707, 724 (1978). Moreover, even if the regulation of speech advances a compelling interest, the State must also show that the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S. Ct. 247, 252, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231, 237 (1960).
B.
 
Guided by that background law, several courts have addressed whether the confidentiality provisions of judicial and attorney disciplinary systems violate the Free Speech Clause.
The United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional, as applied to the news media, a state law that criminally punished anyone who disclosed information about judicial ethics proceedings. Landmark Commc ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 56 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978). In Landmark, supra, a Virginia newspaper published an accurate article reporting that a state judge was the subject of a pending disciplinary investigation. Id. at 831, 98 S. Ct. at 1535, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 6. The newspaper was subsequently convicted under a Virginia statute making it unlawful to identify any judge who was the subject of an investigation by the state commission. Ibid. The newspaper challenged the law, claiming that the statute violated the First Amendment. Virginia argued that maintaining the confidentiality of the judicial disciplinary system was a compelling interest because investigations of misconduct would be impeded and the reputation of judges unjustly discredited if accusations of judicial wrongdoing were permitted to circulate among the public. Id. at 840, 98 S. Ct. at 1542, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 11. The State further contended that criminal sanctions were the only way to ensure that the guarantee of confidentiality is more than an empty promise. Ibid.
The Supreme Court disagreed. Although acknowledging that the State had an interest in protecting the reputations of judges, the Court emphasized that that interest did not justify repressing speech that would otherwise be free. Id. at 841-42, 98 S. Ct. at 1543, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 12 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-73, 84 S. Ct. 710, 722, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 702 (1964). To the contrary,
[t]he assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion. . . . [A]n enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect.
[Ibid. (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71, 62 S. Ct. 190, 197, 86 L. Ed. 192, 207 (1941)).]
The Court recognized that greater public scrutiny of the courts, not less, served to guard against the miscarriage of justice, and that the frank and open discussion of judicial conduct was precisely the type of speech that the First Amendment was adopted to protect. Id. at 839, 98 S. Ct. at 1541-42, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Court in Landmark noted that its decision was limited to the specific issue before it, third-party confidentiality, we are persuaded that the Court s analysis is equally applicable to grievant confidentiality.
In a recent trilogy of cases, courts invalidated or modified state attorney ethics confidentiality rules because the rules were not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest. See Doe v. Sup. Ct., 734 F. Supp. 981 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Doe v. Doe, 127 S.W.3d 728 (Tenn. 2004); Petition of Brooks, 678 A.2d 140 (N.H. 1996). In Doe v. Supreme Court, supra, a grievant challenged a court rule that imposed confidentiality in respect of Florida s attorney disciplinary system at all times. 734 F. Supp. at 983. The State asserted that confidentiality promoted the filing of complaints and encouraged witnesses to cooperate, but the court disagreed:
Why a complainant would be more inclined to file a grievance against his lawyer, with the knowledge that he is thereby forever barred from speaking publicly about the grievance, is unclear. Indeed, it is just as likely that potential claimants would be dissuaded from initiating disciplinary proceedings if they reasonably believed that filing a petition . . . would subject them to a perpetual bar from speaking out about the grievance. Thus, an equally compelling assertion can be made that the effect of [the confidentiality rule], along with the attendant threat that violators of the rule will be held in contempt of court, may actually serve to discourage the filing of complaints, surely a result not in harmony with the regulations intended purpose.
[Id. at 985.]
The court, citing Landmark, also rejected the State s argument that protecting the reputation of attorneys was a compelling interest: If maintaining the reputation of the judiciary as an abstract end is insufficient to justify encroaching upon the robust exercise of free speech, then maintaining the reputation of lawyers or the Bar is . . . equally insufficient. Id. at 986 (emphasis added). Finally, the State maintained that confidentiality was required to protect the investigatory process. Id. at 987. Although the court acknowledged that protecting ongoing investigations was surely worthy, it was troubled by the confidentiality rule s sweep and breadth because public discussion remained stifled even after a claim was found to have merit. Ibid.
In Doe v. Doe, supra, the Supreme Court of Tennessee rejected similar arguments made in support of a confidentiality provision that applied to the entire state attorney ethics process -- complaint, investigation, hearing and judgment. 127 S.W.3d at 732. The State advanced three interests that it considered compelling: protection of attorney reputations, preservation of grievant and witness privacy, and safeguarding of pending proceedings. Id. at 733. The court, however, concluded that even if any of these interests were deemed compelling, the rule was not narrowly tailored because it precluded speech about meritless and meritorious complaints alike. Id. at 736.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Brooks, supra, overturned a court rule that prevented the disclosure of information about disciplinary proceedings. 678 A.2d at 142-43. The court disposed of justifications such as preservation of lawyer reputations and protection of investigative integrity by concluding that the rule was overbroad. Id. at 144-45. The State further argued that the rule served interests in preserving informal discipline and in encouraging the resignation of investigated attorneys. Id. at 144. The court, however, concluded that any gain in efficiency or attorney cooperation resulting from those outcomes was not sufficiently compelling to justify restriction of a complainant s fundamental right to free expression. Id. at 145. See footnote 2
IV.
Constitutionality of Rule 1:20-9
 
We now address whether Rule 1:20-9 violates the First Amendment. The parties and amicus agree that the rule is a content-specific restriction on speech because it prohibits comment on a particular topic, that is, a given disciplinary matter and the associated written records. Therefore, the State bears the burden of demonstrating that the rule is necessary to serve a compelling interest and that it is narrowly tailored to achieve that end.
A.
 
The State argues that maintaining confidentiality in disciplinary proceedings until the filing of a formal ethics complaint furthers three compelling interests: (1) protecting the reputations of lawyers who are unfairly accused of wrongdoing; (2) encouraging attorneys who have committed minor misconduct to agree to diversion; and (3) preserving the integrity of the disciplinary system and its investigative process. We address each argument below.
Protection of Attorneys Reputations
 
It is undisputed that an attorney s reputation is his or her currency. A client s decision to retain a lawyer is based predominantly, if not exclusively, on the lawyer s good professional standing. Because of the nature of the practice of law, even the finest lawyers are bound to draw the ire of clients who are dissatisfied with the course of the representation or the outcome of a matter. Accordingly, it is understandable that the State, the OAE, and the NJSBA propose that the protection of attorneys from unfounded accusations of misconduct is a compelling interest.
Although we are sympathetic to the plight of attorneys whose reputations are sullied, preventing reputational injuries is an insufficient reason for repressing speech that would otherwise be free. Landmark, supra, 435 U.S. at 841-42, 98 S. Ct. at 1543, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 12 (quoting N.Y. Times, supra, 376 U.S. at 272-73, 84 S. Ct. at 722, 11 L. Ed. 2d at 702); see also Doe v. Sup. Ct., supra, 734 F. Supp. at 988 (expressing doubt that suppression of truthful criticism of lawyers would somehow enhance or protect the reputation of the Bar ). Even if safeguarding the good repute of lawyers was sufficiently compelling, Rule 1:20-9 is not narrowly tailored because it sweeps in far more speech than is necessary to achieve that objective when it punishes discussion of grievances found to have merit. See Doe v. Doe, supra, 127 S.W 3d at 734-35 ( [A] confidentiality provision precluding the disclosure of both frivolous and non-frivolous complaints is not sufficiently narrowly tailored . . . . ).
The State further contends that even if speech about meritorious grievances cannot be restrained, meritless complaints deserve no such protection. According to the State, [p]ublication of grievances that are dismissed or unsubstantiated does not serve the purpose of protecting potential clients of the charged attorney, since the attorney has not been found to have acted unethically. To the contrary, if an attorney is cleared of unethical conduct, then his or her interest in suppressing the existence of an accusation is greatly diminished. Cf. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 632, 110 S. Ct. 1376, 1381, 108 L. Ed. 2d 572, 581-82 (1990) (stating that grand jury secrecy is no longer necessary once targeted individual has been exonerated). Indeed, revelation that the grievance was baseless should in most cases reassure clients and the public that the attorney did nothing wrong. Cf. N.Y. Times, supra, 376 U.S. at 279 n.19, 84 S. Ct. at 729 n.19, 11 L. Ed. 2d at 706 n.19 ( [T]he clearer perception and livelier impression of truth [is] produced by its collision with error. (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The current rules, however, bar the grievant from ever discussing a dismissal of his or her grievance. Shielding dismissed grievances behind a permanent wall of silence does less to enhance respect for the legal profession and the ethics process than it does to engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt. Landmark, supra, 435 U.S. at 842, 98 S. Ct. at 1543, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 12 (quoting Bridges, supra, 314 U.S. at 270-71, 62 S. Ct. at 197, 86 L. Ed. at 207). We conclude, therefore, that even when the ethics authorities deem a grievance to be meritless, the grievant has the constitutional right to discuss and disagree with the determination of those authorities.
Encouragement of Diversion
 
According to the State, Rule 1:20-9 advances the salutary goals of resolving minor ethical matters through diversion in lieu of further disciplinary proceedings. We recognize the value of encouraging attorneys to cooperate with an investigation, remedy past harm, and take measures to prevent a future lapse of judgment or competence. However, the State s interest in achieving a matter s speedy resolution does not justify infringing a grievant s free exercise of truthful speech. Brooks, supra, 678 A.2d at 145. The goal of the disciplinary system -- protecting the public from unethical attorneys -- is not served by suppressing accurate statements about actual misconduct, even if minor. Furthermore, a broad reading of the rule would preclude a grievant from publicly expressing his or her belief that the disciplinary system treated the respondent attorney s misconduct too lightly. Criticism of such a quasi-governmental body is entitled to the widest room for discussion [and] the narrowest range for its restriction. State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 412 (1980) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S. Ct. 315, 323, 89 L. Ed. 430, 440 (1945)).
Integrity of Pending Investigations
 
The State also asserts that confidentiality helps guarantee the integrity of pending investigations by encouraging the cooperation of witnesses, enabling a full and thorough review of the matter, and promoting the filing of grievances. To accomplish those objectives, the State insists that a grievant cannot be permitted to disclose that he or she filed a grievance. We disagree. Although undoubtedly legitimate interests, they are not sufficiently compelling to justify restricting grievants speech. Further, even if those interests could be considered compelling, Rule 1:20-9 is not narrowly tailored to achieve them.
We first consider the claim that maintaining confidentiality encourages witnesses to fully cooperate with ongoing investigations. The State argues that secrecy in ethics proceedings is a compelling interest because, like grand jury secrecy, it promotes free and untrammeled disclosures by witnesses. United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954). However, the justifications for grand jury secrecy are simply not present in a disciplinary investigation. Grand jury proceedings are kept secret from a suspect in order to prevent him or her from fleeing and to protect witnesses from intimidation or bribes. Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 219, 99 S. Ct 1667, 1673, 60 L. Ed. 2d 156, 165 (1979). In an ethics proceeding the respondent attorney is notified that allegations of unethical conduct have been reported, R. 1:20-3(g)(2), is informed of the substance of that grievance, ibid., and is generally entitled to the identity and contact information of the grievant and potential witnesses, R. 1:20-5(a)(2)(D). The attorney also may obtain copies of any witness statements and summaries thereof. R. 1:20-5(a)(2)(B). Thus, from the outset, the respondent attorney knows what the charges are, who made them, and who can corroborate them.
Furthermore, the scope of grand jury secrecy is narrower than the confidentiality provision in Rule 1:20-9. In the grand jury context, the obligation to keep an investigation secret extends only to the prosecutor, the grand jurors, and court staff. R. 3:6-7. A crime victim who makes a report to the police is not required to keep that fact confidential, and witnesses who appear before the grand jury are not prohibited from discussing the content of their own testimony. Ibid.; see also United States v. Sells Eng g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 425, 103 S. Ct. 3133, 3139, 77 L. Ed. 2d 743, 753 (1983) (explaining that under analogous federal rule, witnesses are generally not prohibited from disclosing their own testimony). In contrast, under Rule 1:20-9(a) and (h), all participants, including grievants, are barred from divulging that a grievance has been filed and that an investigation is underway. Such a prohibition not only exceeds the extent of secrecy traditionally afforded grand jury hearings, but is uniquely broad among the State s other systems of professional discipline. In New Jersey, over seventy professions are subject to regulation, but, as the State acknowledges, only persons who file ethics charges against attorneys are prohibited from discussing their grievances. Compare R. 1:20-9, with N.J.S.A. 45:1-1 to -27.
Even assuming that encouraging witnesses to cooperate with disciplinary authorities is a compelling interest, Rule 1:20-9 is not narrowly tailored to achieve that end. As the Supreme Court recognized in Landmark, supra, the risks associated with premature disclosure of an investigation can be largely eliminated through careful internal procedures that protect confidentiality. 435 U.S. at 845, 98 S. Ct. at 1545, 56 L. Ed 2d at 14 (emphasis added). At a minimum, we can and do require disciplinary authorities themselves to keep the existence and substance of an investigation secret, see R. 1:20-9(h), and nothing in the First Amendment prevents us from imposing this obligation, see Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L. Ed 2d 811, 817 (1968) ( [T]he State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. ). And, although we recognize that voluntary cooperation by witnesses is desirable, their testimony can be secured by means that are less restrictive of a grievant s speech. For example, as with grand jury investigations, a subpoena can be issued to compel the appearance of a reluctant witness. R. 1:20-3(g)(6); see also Butterworth, supra, 494 U.S. at 634, 110 S. Ct. at 1382, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 582 ( [S]ubpoena and contempt powers [are] available to bring recalcitrant witnesses to the stand. ); Doe v. Doe, supra, 127 S.W 3d at 736 (concluding that because subpoenas are available, guarantee of confidentiality has little additional effect ). Further, all witnesses appearing at disciplinary hearings are duly sworn, R. 1:20-6(c)(2)(A), providing reasonable assurance that they will testify fully and frankly, Douglas Oil, supra, 441 U.S. at 219, 99 S. Ct. at 1673, 60 L. Ed 2d at 165. See also Butterworth, supra, 494 U.S. at 633, 110 S. Ct. at 1382, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 582 (stating that perjury laws eliminate need for speech-restrictive rules intended to promote truthful testimony).
The State further argues that confidentiality protects the ability of disciplinary authorities to make a full and fair investigation -- an objective that overlaps substantially with the interest in promoting witness cooperation. Certainly, disclosure that an investigation is ongoing has the potential to invite the exertion of outside influence. However, that possibility is speculative. In any event, the risk of coercion can be minimized by the same procedures that ensure witness cooperation: the use of subpoenas and the imposition of criminal sanctions for witness tampering, destruction of evidence, and attempts to unduly pressure officials. See ibid.
Finally, the State asserts that encouraging persons to file grievances is a compelling interest that is furthered by investigative confidentiality. To be sure, the reporting of attorney misconduct is of extreme importance for both the protection of the public and the success of the legal system. And, as a general rule, a grievant will be more likely to report unethical conduct by an attorney if disciplinary authorities are prohibited from revealing publicly the grievant s identity or the substance of the grievance. However, imposing on grievants the same obligation of nondisclosure provides little, if any, added benefit. The lawyer who may be the target of the complaint surely will learn about the grievance and the identity of the complainant, whether the procedures are deemed confidential or not. Doe v. Sup. Ct., supra, 734 F. Supp. at 985. Furthermore, as this matter demonstrates, not all grievants desire anonymity, and indeed, some grievants may be deterred from filing ethics complaints because they are forbidden from publicizing that fact. See ibid. (noting that perpetual bar from speaking out about [a] grievance may actually discourage filing of grievances). A more narrowly drawn rule would encourage, rather than require, grievants to preserve confidentiality. See ibid.; Brooks, supra, 678 A.2d at 145. In that way, a grievant who wishes to avoid public attention can curtail his or her own speech, free from government encroachment. Cf. Butterworth, supra, 494 U.S. at 633, 110 S. Ct. at 1382, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 582 (holding that interest in protecting grand jury witnesses from retribution is not advanced by prohibition against witness discussion of own testimony; any witness is free not to divulge his own testimony ).
B.
 
We conclude that Rule 1:20-9, as written and as applied, violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling interest. Protecting the reputations of attorneys and the bar does not justify restricting a grievant s speech, and, in fact, such restrictions breed resentment rather than respect. Additionally, the confidentiality rule seeks to protect not only the reputation of the affected lawyer, but also the disciplinary process itself. Rule 1:20-9 imposes a period of enforced silence upon the filing of the grievance during which time the grievant cannot discuss the fact that he or she has filed a grievance or, more important, criticize the District Ethics Committees for unreasonably delaying the investigation of the allegedly errant lawyer. Restraining criticism of the District Ethics Committees cannot survive First Amendment scrutiny. Indeed, we delegate to the District Ethics Committees the responsibility to police members of the legal profession, and both this Court and those committees are part of the government that the public has a right to discuss and debate. The judiciary is no more immune from the reach of the First Amendment than the executive or legislative branches.
Furthermore, although diversion is a valued component of the attorney ethics process, forbidding a grievant from discussing a grievance simply because the process resulted in diversion risks suppressing criticism of our disciplinary system. Fostering an environment where individuals are free to criticize government is precisely what the First Amendment is designed to do. Therefore, if the District Ethics Committee recommends that the matter be diverted, the fact that the respondent attorney admitted to minor misconduct and accepted diversion may be made public, but the contents of that agreement shall be kept confidential. This arrangement furthers the State s legitimate interest in encouraging diversion while accommodating grievants First Amendment right to discuss their own grievances and the proceedings that follow.
Protecting the integrity of pending investigations is a worthy goal, but, for the above reasons, it is not a compelling interest that justifies a prohibition on speech that would otherwise be free. Investigations can be adequately protected by less restrictive means than curtailing free expression. As the Conference of Chief Justices observed: Gag rules prohibiting complainants from publicly discussing the complaint have been found unconstitutional and should never be imposed. A National Action Plan on Lawyer Conduct and Professionalism: A Report of the Working Group on Lawyer Conduct and Professionalism 19, II.D.1 (Jan. 21, 1999), available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/natlplan/NatlActionPlan.html. Accordingly, we hold that a grievant is not barred from divulging the fact that he or she filed a grievance, the content of that grievance, and the result of the process.
Although our holding invalidates the confidentiality provisions of Rule 1:20-9, there are still means whereby the disciplinary system can further an attorney s interest in confidentiality without violating the First Amendment. First, the District Ethics Committee can recommend that the grievant maintain the confidentiality of the process during the investigatory stage and the grievant can agree to do so when it is in his or her interest. Further, there may be some disciplinary investigations in which the need for secrecy is paramount and the potential harm from premature disclosure is so great that the ethics investigator may have good cause to seek an order compelling the grievant to keep confidential the investigatory proceedings. Under such circumstances, the disciplinary authorities, if they can establish a compelling need for secrecy based on the specific and articulable facts of a case, can seek an appropriate order requiring confidentiality. Finally, we observe that although grievants are absolutely immune from suit for filing an ethics complaint or making statements within the context of subsequent disciplinary proceedings, they are not immune for statements made outside the context of a disciplinary matter, such as to the media or in another public forum. See In re Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complainants, 96 N.J. 669, 674-75 & n.3 (1984) (explaining that grievant s public defamatory statements are actionable). Accordingly, grievants who falsely smear an attorney in public do so at their peril and may face defamation actions in appropriate cases.See footnote 3
V.
Retroactivity
 
Because we introduce a new rule in respect of confidentiality, we must determine whether the rule applies retroactively or prospectively. See State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 249 (1996). R.M. urges that the principles espoused in this opinion be given full retroactive effect. In contrast, the State, the OAE, and the PRRC advocate that any new rule should apply only prospectively. To determine whether a new rule is to be applied retroactively, we consider three factors: (1) the purpose of the rule and whether it would be furthered by a retroactive application, (2) the degree of reliance placed on the old rule by those who administered it, and (3) the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice. Id. at 251.
The confidentiality rule serves to protect the First Amendment rights of grievants while preserving the disciplinary system s ability to conduct investigations. Although retroactivity may promote free expression and does not frustrate currently pending investigations, participants have placed great reliance on the prior rule of confidentiality. Before the current rule change, grievants and witnesses participated in ethics investigations with the understanding that their identity would remain confidential unless a formal complaint was filed. Retroactively applying the new rule would reveal their identities and statements despite those assurances of confidentiality. Furthermore, attorneys accused of minor wrongdoing have accepted diversion on the condition of confidentiality.
We find that full retroactivity would impose an undue hardship on participants who justifiably relied on the old confidentiality rule. Accordingly, the preexisting confidentiality rule shall remain in effect in previously concluded matters, whether dismissed, diverted, or otherwise resolved. A purely prospective application, however, would unnecessarily inhibit speech that would otherwise be free. Thus, we hold instead that the new rule of confidentiality shall be given pipeline retroactivity, id. at 249, and shall apply in all future cases and in matters that are still pending in the disciplinary system. R.M. is entitled to the benefit of this ruling, see Kibble v. Weeks Dredging & Constr. Co., 161 N.J. 178, 196 (1999), and is hereby permitted to discuss her grievance against Jane Doe, the subsequent ethics proceedings, and the outcome.
VI.
A.
 
Ultimately, First Amendment rights, the public interest, and the concerns of grievants require that we adjust the scope of confidentiality to allow for greater public scrutiny. Although public confidence may be shaken when an attorney commits a wrongful act, that confidence is renewed when the wrong is appropriately addressed and remedied. To accomplish that goal, citizens must be able to observe the disciplinary process unfold at the earliest responsible stage. Comment to R. 1:20-9 [1995 Revision], reprinted in Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules 1996. As always, [s]unlight is . . . the best of disinfectants. Justice Louis Brandeis, Other People s Money 62 (Nat l Home Library Found. ed. 1933). Accordingly, we hold that a grievant may speak publicly regarding the fact that a grievance was filed, the content of that grievance, and the result of the process. The fact that a matter is diverted and that the attorney admitted to a violation of the disciplinary rules is no longer confidential, but the contents of the diversion agreement itself are not to be disclosed. Documents that are gathered during the ethics proceedings are not to be released publicly by disciplinary officials except as provided for in Rule 1:20-9(a), (i). See supra pp. 8-9 (listing exceptions to the confidentiality rule). These rules apply in this appeal and to all ethics matters currently pending.
We refer this matter to the PRRC to draft rule amendments that conform to this opinion. Because any proposed amendments are subject to this Court s review and approval, the guidelines set forth herein shall serve as interim rules until the formal adoption of the amendments.
B.
 
In 1995, when the confidentiality provision underwent substantial revision and the disciplinary process became open to the public in a significant way for the first time, there was some concern regarding the anticipated effect such changes would have on the practice of law in New Jersey. Mark E. Hopkins, Note, Open Attorney Discipline: New Jersey Supreme Court s Decision to Make Attorney Disciplinary Procedures Public -- What It Means to Attorneys and to the Public, 27 Rutgers L.J. 757, 757-78 (1996). However, we were guided in our decision by this simple fact:
[T]he public is entitled to this information, entitled to know of charges against attorneys, entitled to know who is the subject of those charges, and, most of all, entitled to know how the system is working. It is their system, not ours, not the attorneys ; it is their system just as is the rest of the justice system.
[Administrative Determinations Relating to the 1993 Report of the New Jersey Ethics Commission (1994).]
Notwithstanding the apprehension concerning those new rules, the experience since 1995 has been positive because parties, including grievants, have generally conducted themselves responsibly. We are confident, and expect, that participants in the disciplinary process will continue to act conscientiously and that the changes we introduce in this opinion will enable attorneys to retain the trust that the public has reposed in the profession.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE, and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI s opinion. On the issue of immunity for grievants, CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ has filed a separate CONCURRING opinion in which JUSTICES LONG, ALBIN, and WALLACE join, and JUSTICE ZAZZALI has filed a separate CONCURRING opinion in which JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and RIVERA-SOTO join.

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A- 89 September Term 2004
 
 
R.M.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY, DISTRICT XIII ETHICS COMMITTEE and OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS,

Defendants-Respondents,

and

JANE DOE,

Defendant.

CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ, concurring.
Three members of the Court would refer the question of immunity for grievants to the PRRC for detailed reasons supporting the Committee s recommendation that absolute immunity should be eliminated if the confidentiality requirement is eliminated, even though that issue is not properly before the Court. I observe, first, that in 1995 the Court substantially limited confidentiality requirements under the rule without a corresponding limitation on absolute immunity and that adverse consequences to lawyers have not been reported. In any case, the underlying rationale for the majority opinion in Matter of Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complainants, 96 N.J. 669, 675 (1984), was not that immunity is inextricably linked to confidentiality, but rather, that immunity fosters public trust in our disciplinary system and, most important, ameliorates concerns that non-malicious potential complainants may be deterred from filing ethics complaints in fear of retaliation by the attorney. Because I believe that that rationale is as valid today as it was in 1984, I see no reason to seek guidance from the PRRC on the immunity question.
Justices Long, Albin and Wallace join in this opinion.

 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A- 89 September Term 2004
 
 
R.M.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY, DISTRICT XIII ETHICS COMMITTEE and OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS,

Defendants-Respondents,

and

JANE DOE,

Defendant.

JUSTICE ZAZZALI, concurring.
As the majority opinion notes, the Professional Responsibility Rules Committee proposed that if the Court limits the scope of the confidentiality requirements, then the Court should eliminate absolute immunity for grievants. That issue was neither raised by petitioner nor included in the Court s grant of certification. That said, I am inclined to agree with the PRRC recommendation, and, at the very least, would remand the matter to the PRRC to provide a detailed basis for its recommendation.
Justices LaVecchia and Rivera-Soto join in this opinion. 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
NO. A-89 SEPTEMBER TERM 2004
ON CERTIFICATION TO Law Division, Superior Court 

R.M.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY,
DISTRICT XIII ETHICS
COMMITTEE and OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY ETHICS,

Defendants-Respondents,

and

JANE DOE,

Defendant.

DECIDED October 19, 2005
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Zazzali 
CONCURRING OPINIONS BY Chief Justice Poritz and Justice Zazzali
DISSENTING OPINION BY 

CHECKLIST REMAND 
IMMUNITY ISSUE NO FURTHER ACTION IMMUNITY ISSUE - REMAND CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ X 
X JUSTICE LONG X 
X JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X 
X JUSTICE ZAZZALI X 
X JUSTICE ALBIN X 
X JUSTICE WALLACE X 
X JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO X 
X TOTALS 7 

 
Footnote: 1 The parties refer to this determination as a finding of probable cause. Later in this opinion, we reference cases from other jurisdictions with court rules substantially similar to ours that also speak in terms of probable cause to file disciplinary charges. See Doe v. Sup. Ct., 734 F. Supp. 981, 985 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Doe v. Doe, 127 S.W.3d 728, 736 (Tenn. 2004). To remain consistent, and for brevity s sake, we consider a finding of probable cause to be synonymous with a reasonable prospect of a finding of unethical conduct by clear and convincing evidence, R. 1:20-4(a), for the purposes of this appeal. 
Footnote: 2 We note that fifteen states, including New Jersey, explicitly require grievants to preserve confidentiality. See N.J. Ct. R. 1:20-9(a), (h); Ala. R. Discip. Proc. 30(a), (c); Alaska Bar R. 22(b); Ark. R. Prof l Conduct 6A(3); Del. Laws. R. Discip. Proc. 13(g); Idaho Bar Comm n R. 521(a)(1); Iowa Code Ann. R. 35.7; La. Sup. Ct. R. 19 16I; Md. R. 16-723(f)(2); Miss. Code Ann. 73-3-343; Mont. Law. Discip. Enforcement R. 20(D); Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 121; S.D. Codified Laws 16-19-99; Tex. R. Discip. Proc. 2.16E; Utah R. Law. Discip. & Disability 15(i). In contrast, sixteen other jurisdictions either expressly exempt grievants from the confidentiality rule or provide that the rule applies only to disciplinary officials. See 17A Ariz. Code Ann. Sup. Ct. R. 70(a); Colo. Ct. R. Ann. 251.31(a), (b); Fla. Stat. Ann. Bar R. 3-7.1; Ga. State Bar R. 4-221(d)(3); Kan. Discip. R. 222(d); Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.150(8); Me. Bar R. 7.3(k)(1); Mass Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 4:01 20(1)(c); N.Y. 1st Dep t Ct. R. 605.24; N.D. Law. Discip. R. 6.1(A); Ohio Sup. Ct. R. Gov t Bar 5 11(E)(2)(a); Or. Rev. Stat. Bar R. 1.7; S.C. App. Ct. R. Law. Discip. Enforcement 12(b); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9 25.5; Vt. Ct. R. Prof l Resp. Program 12A; Wyo. R. Discip. Code 5(a).
In the remaining jurisdictions, rules of attorney discipline do not specify which participants are obligated to maintain confidentiality. Cal. Ann. Bus. & Prof l Code 6086.1(b); Conn. Practice Book 2-35(c)(ii); D.C. Bar R. 11 17(a); Haw. Sup. Ct. R. 2.22(a); Ill. Stat. Ann. Sup. Ct. R. 766(a); Ind. Code Ann. Admission & Discip. R. 23 22(a); Mich. Ct. R. 9.126(A); 52 Minn. R. Prof l Resp. 20(a); Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 5.31(b); Neb. Discip. R. 18(A); N.H. R. Sup. Ct. 37(21)(a); N.M. Discip. R. 17-304A; N.Y. 2d Dep t Ct. R. 691.4(j); N.Y. 3d Ct. R. 806.4(c)(5); N.Y. 4th Dep t Jud. L. 90; N.C. State Bar Council R. subch. 1B, B.0129(a); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 1-A, R. 5.7; Pa. R. Discip. Enforcement 402(a); R.I. Sup. Ct. R. 21; Va. R. Sup. Ct. pt. 6, IV, 13(N)(1); Wash. Ct. R. Law. Conduct 3.1(a); W. Va. R. Law. Discip. Proc. 2.6; Wisc. Sup. Ct. R. 22.40(1). 
 
Footnote: 3 We note that R.M. has not asked that ethics proceedings or documents generally be made public. Rather, in this appeal, R.M. s request is narrow: she wishes to disclose publicly that she filed a grievance against Jane Doe (using her real name), that Jane Doe admitted minor misconduct and entered a diversionary agreement, and that R.M. is dissatisfied with that result. Thus, our holding does not alter the requirement that disciplinary authorities continue to be bound by the confidentiality provisions in Rule 1:20-9. As provided for in Rule 1:20-9(a) and (i), all written records compiled by the investigator and the District Ethics Committee received and made pursuant to the investigation are not to be made public by disciplinary officials except as provided in that Rule. The disclosure of sensitive and frequently privileged information is neither required by constitutional principle nor reflective of good policy.