Faulting City's 'Cavalier Attitude,' Judge OKs Stop-and-Frisk Class
Mark Hamblett
New York Law Journal
05-17-2012
Alluding to what she called "overwhelming evidence" that the New York
Police Department is running a centralized stop-and-frisk program that
has led to thousands of unconstitutional stops, a federal judge
yesterday certified a 2008 class action suit challenging the
controversial policy.
In the process, Southern District Judge Shira Scheindlin
(See Profile)
said she found New York City's attitude toward the suit to be "deeply
troubling." She criticized the city's Law Department for stating that a
court order to block the practice would amount to "judicial intrusion"
and arguing that no injunction could guarantee that suspicionless stops
would never occur or would occur in only a certain number of cases.
The judge observed in
Floyd v. City of New York,
08 Civ. 1034, that what was important at the class certification stage
was "the substantive question of whether or not the unlawful stops of
putative class members result from a common source: the department's
policy of establishing performance standards and demanding increased
levels of stops and frisks. The preponderance of the evidence shows that
the answer to that question is yes."
She noted that the vast majority of New Yorkers who are unlawfully
stopped will never file a lawsuit in response, and class-action status
was created for just these kinds of cases.
Read the city's brief and the plaintiffs' brief.
The lawsuit alleged that the NYPD purposefully engaged in a
widespread practice of concentrating its stop-and-frisk activity in
black and Hispanic neighborhoods based on their racial composition
rather than legitimate non-racial factors. The lawsuit said officers are
pressured to meet quotas for stops, and they are punished if they do
not.
Assembly Committees to Hold Hearings
Several Assembly committees will hold a hearing tomorrow in Manhattan
on the New York Police Department's stop-and-frisk policies. The
hearing will be held from 10:30-1:30 p.m. in the Assembly's hearing
room, Room 1923, at 250 Broadway.
The committees organizing the hearing are Codes and Correction. Also
participating is the New York State Black, Puerto Rican, Hispanic and
Asian Legislative Caucus.
To testify, contact Dee Levy, senior analyst to the Assembly Committee on Codes, at
levyd@assembly.state.ny.us or 518-455-4313.
The Law Department had been fighting an uphill battle to block class
certification, which has seemed virtually certain since Scheindlin
rejected the city's motion for summary judgment in September (NYLJ,
Sept. 1, 2001).
In her 57-page opinion, Scheindlin wrote that "Defendants' cavalier
attitude towards the prospect of a 'widespread practice of suspicionless
stops' displays a deeply troubling apathy towards New Yorkers' most
fundamental constitutional rights."
And, she said, "if the NYPD is engaging in a widespread practice of
unlawful stops, then an injunction seeking to curb that practice is not a
'judicial intrusion into a social institution' but a vindication of the
Constitution and an exercise of the court's most important function:
protecting individual rights in the face of the government's
malfeasance."
A Law Department spokeswoman said yesterday, "We respectfully disagree with the decision and are reviewing our legal options."
Lawyers for the named plaintiffs in the case expect Scheindlin's
certification decision to be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.
The plaintiffs are represented by Darius Charney and Sunita Patel of
the Center for Constitutional Rights; Jonathan Moore and Jennifer
Borchetta of Beldock Levine & Hoffman; and Eric Hellerman, Philip
Irwin and Gretchen Hoff-Varner of Covington & Burling.
Charney said in a statement that the judge's ruling means that "those
for whom this practice is a daily reality will now have an opportunity
to challenge it as a violation of their fundamental constitutional
rights and to ask the Court to order real changes in NYPD stop-and-frisk
policy."
Crime-Fighting Tool?
According to the decision, more than 2.8 million stop-and-frisks were
conducted between 2004 and 2009. Half were of blacks, 30 percent were
of Latinos and only 10 percent were of whites.
The lawsuit charges the practice violates the Fourth Amendment's
right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures and the 14th
Amendment right to be free of discrimination based on race.
The numbers were worse last year, the plaintiffs charge, as a record
685,724 stops were made, an increase of 600 percent since Raymond Kelly
was named police commissioner in 2002. Of those stopped in 2011, 84
percent were black or Hispanic and 88 percent of those stopped were not
arrested and did not receive summons.
In denying the city's summary judgment motion in September,
Scheindlin said that "the increasingly widespread use of this policing
tool in New York City is not to be taken lightly, even in those cases
where the individuals are not detained for more than a few minutes, and
even if the practice causes some reduction in the City's crime rate."
The judge followed that opinion with another in April, when she ruled
plaintiffs' expert, Jeffery Fagan, a Columbia Law professor and
director of the school's Center for Crime, Community and Law, could
testify at trial about his conclusions on racial disparities in the
stops
(NYLJ, April 17).
Scheindlin found Fagan's report, which analyzed 175,000 stops and
focused on racial disparities and the extent to which they complied with
the Fourth Amendment, was "methodologically sound," rejecting the
city's challenge to his expertise.
The Law Department's Heidi Grossman wrote that Fagan is not a lawyer,
"has never worked in a law enforcement field, has never completed a
[stop-and-frisk] form, never conducted a Stop, Question & Frisk
(SQF) and never observed more than a few SQF's or gone along with an
NYPD officer to observe an SQF."
Scheindlin said in Wednesday's ruling that five nonprofit
organizations have filed amicus briefs saying the stop-and-frisk
practices are "harmful, degrading and demoralizing for too many young
people in New York," and 27 of 51 New York City Council members filed a
second amicus saying the practice "reinforces negative racial
stereotypes" and have created "a growing distrust on the part of Black
and Latino residents."
But the city shows no indication of backing down on a practice that
the Bloomberg administration insists is an effective crime-fighting
tool. It has contended from the beginning that it is not engaged in
racial profiling but conducts the lion's share of stop-and-frisks in
high crime areas, a contention disputed by the plaintiffs and Fagan.
Just last week, Mayor Michael Bloomberg said that, over the past
decade, stop-and-frisks deserve much credit for the dramatic drop in the
city's murder rate, as 5,600 fewer people were killed compared with the
previous decade.
"That's 5,600 men, women and children who are alive today who would
not be" if the police did not engage in stop-and-frisk, Bloomberg said.
"We know that 90 percent of the murder victims in this city are black
and Hispanic. So 90 percent of those 5,600 probably would have been
minorities."
In certifying a Fourth Amendment class, Scheindlin said that, in 6
percent of all documented stops, the officers' stated reasons for the
stops were facially insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion:
"That is to say, by their own explanations for their actions, NYPD
officers conducted at least 170,000 unlawful stops between 2004 and
2009."
In 62,000 of those cases, she said, officers cited no more than a
"furtive movement" to justify the stop, and in over 4,000 stops gave no
reason other than "high crime area."
Certifying a Fourteenth Amendment subclass, Scheindlin cited the
Fagan report as saying blacks and Latinos are significantly more likely
to be stopped and frisked than whites "even after adjusting for local
crime rates, racial composition of the local population, police patrol
strength, and other social and economic factors predictive of police
enforcement activity."
Moreover, she again cited Fagan for the notion that blacks and
Hispanics "are treated more harshly during stop-and-frisk encounters
with NYPD officers than whites who are stopped on suspicion of the same
or similar crimes."
The city reached a settlement in 2003 on its stop-and-frisk policy in
Daniels v. City Of New York,
99 Civ. 1695, agreeing to enact a policy against racial profiling,
revise the form police use when they conduct a stop and conduct regular
audits of those forms.
Scheindlin currently has two other, related stop-and-frisk cases,
Davis v. City of New York, 10-cv-699, which challenges stops in New York City public housing, and
Ligon v. City of New York,
12-cv-2274, which challenges stops in private buildings under the
NYPD's "Operation Clean Halls" program. The program allows private
landlords or building managers to enroll and have police patrol their
hallways.
The city settled a fourth stop-and-frisk case this week, agreeing to
cease the practice of stopping and frisking passengers of livery cabs
whose drivers are part of a voluntary police safety program that allows
police to stop livery cars without probable cause
(NYLJ, May 16).
@|Mark Hamblett can be contacted at mhamblett@alm.com
16 comments:
we've gotta do more than just express our disgust and opinions...
i know that there are many who are reading this blog that still have legitimate causes of action that have, in one way or another, been affected by the actions, or by similar actions that are at the heart of this Complaint...
you must assess your own matter and find an effective means of bringing it to the attention of the highest judicial or legislative body available... and within your filings, give ample mention of this current action... and others that show how the Constitution of the US and of the State are being routinely disregarded and violated by those in positions of apparent authority...
you must stand up and fight... whatever you stand to lose pales in comparison of what you will surely lose if you remain silent...
this action needs your support...
--Michael A. Hense is Searching For Rule Of Law In America
and in response to tweet from #SecClinton dialog with CivilSociety, i replied with this... .@StateDept "Rule of Law".. i keep hearing this phrase.. #SecClinton PLEASE, HELP US HERE IN NY http://blackwallofsilencepart1.blogspot.com/ exposecorruptcourts.blogspot.com
get on twitter now and let em hear from you...
--Michael A. Hense is Searching For Rule Of Law In America
NO ONE FROM NEW YORK CAN HELP WITH THE CORRUPTION !!!!!!
In disciplinary proceedings involving sexual misconduct, two-year suspensions have been imposed where the attorneys had sexual relations with their clients. Shorter periods of suspension are appropriate where an attorney has made sexually oriented or offensive comments" (Matter of Isaac, 76 AD3d 48, 52 [2010] [internal citations omitted]). Thus, for example, in Matter of Weinstock (241 AD2d 1 [1998]), an attorney was suspended for two years for exposing his private parts to a family court client on two occasions and engaging in oral sex with the client on at least one of the occasions. In Matter of Isaac (76 AD3d 48, supra), an attorney who made unwanted sexual advances toward a client was suspended for six months, with the court taking into consideration his age and his long and unblemished record practicing law [FN2]
Are you kidding me "sexual advances" more like "FELONY LEVEL SEXUAL ABUSE", extortion, coercion, unlawful imprisonment, obstruction of justice, etc. what the heck are these people smoking!!!!!!
"with the court taking into consideration his age and his long and unblemished record practicing law".
I hardly think he had an "unblemished record"..it's more like he had the "RIGHT CONNECTIONS" in the right places!!
Corrado v East End Pool & Hot Tub, Inc.
Nicole Corrado, Respondent,
v
East End Pool &Hot Tub, Inc., et al., Appellants. —[*1] Faust Goetz Schenker & Blee, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Lisa L. Gokhulsingh of counsel), for appellants.
Paris & Chaikin, New York, N.Y. (Jason L. Paris and Sourean A. Israelyan of counsel), for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for negligence and breach of contract, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Rosengarten, J.), dated May 13, 2009, which, among other things, denied that branch of their cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover damages for negligence and otherwise denying the branch of the cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint with leave to renew after the completion of discovery; as so modified, the order is affirmed, with costs to the plaintiff.
The gravamen of the negligence cause of action in this case is that the work performed under the contract was performed in a less than skillful and workmanlike manner. Such a cause of action sounds in breach of contract, not negligence (see Staten Is. N.Y. CVS, Inc. v Gordon Retail Dev., LLC, 57 AD3d 760, 763 [2008]; Panasuk v Viola Park Realty, LLC, 41 AD3d 804, 805 [2007]). The plaintiff's allegations of negligence are "merely a restatement, albeit in slightly different language, of the . . . contractual obligations asserted in the cause[s] of action [alleging] breach of contract" (Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v Long Is. R.R. Co., 70 NY2d 382, 390 [1987]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the negligence cause of action.
The defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of demonstrating entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the remaining causes of action (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). As the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden, we need not consider the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]). In any event, the defendants' cross motion was made before discovery was complete, and many of the essential issues of fact are within the knowledge of individuals who have not yet been deposed (see Long Is. Power Auth. v Anderson, [*2]67 AD3d 652 [2009]; Town of Riverhead v County of Suffolk, 66 AD3d 1004 [2009]; Yerushalmi & Assoc., LLP v Westland Overseas Corp., 21 AD3d 1098, 1099 [2005]).
The defendants' remaining contention is without merit (see CPLR 325 [d]; NY City Civ Ct Act §§ 201, 202). Skelos, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Lott, JJ., concur.