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I bring Sanders v. Grenadier Realty, Inc, ____Fed. Appx. _____, 2010 WL 605715 (2d Cir. Feb. 22, 2010), because it contains a nice concise summary of the new motion to dismiss standards under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). As the court explained:
To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In considering whether a claim is facially plausible, we do not accept legal conclusions as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, the conclusion that defendants discriminated against plaintiffs on account of their race and national origin in violation of . . . section[] 1982” does not state a plausible claim to relief. While paragraph 17 does allege facts consistent with a discrimination claim, i.e., that non-black residents were granted subsidies, it nevertheless “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief,” id. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation marks
omitted)), because plaintiffs do not allege any facts supporting an inference of racial animus. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the § 1982 claim.
Mitchell H. Rubinstein
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