Saturday, January 21, 2012

Court funding to be focus of state Bar meeting Monday, Jan 23, 2012

Court funding cuts and the effect those cuts have had on New York’s justice system will be among the key topics for discussion at the New York State Bar Association’s 135th Annual Meeting in Manhattan, which starts on Monday.
The week-long conference will include forums on immigration, court funding, representation of veterans, diversity in the legal community and the impact of the Bernie Madoff fraud case on international litigation. More than 5,000 lawyers are expected.
Among those scheduled to address the conference are William Robinson III, president of the American Bar Association; Jack Rives, executive director of the American Bar Association; state Chief Judge Jonathan Lipmann; state Chief Administrative Judge A. Gail Prudenti; former state Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye and former Governor David Paterson. U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder will be presented with the Gold Medal, the Bar Association’s highest award, for lifelong excellence in the legal profession and his civic contributions.
On Wednesday, the conference will feature a panel on the crisis in state court funding across the United States. The Bar Association this week released a report that identified problems with the court system in the wake of state budget cuts, including long delays and postponements in civil and criminal cases, overcrowded court calendars, problems with jury selection and jury service, limited citizen access to legal services and overworked court employees, among other issues. Former state Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye (now of counsel with Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, & Flom), will moderate a panel of state and national experts on the topic. American Bar Association President William T. Robinson’s keynote address also will focus on court funding.
For a complete listing of speakers, program and events, go to www.nysba.org/am2012. Founded in 1876, the 77,000-member New York State Bar Association is the largest state bar association in the country.

Who Judges the Judges?

by David King, Gotham Gazette, Nov 14, 2011

On June 8, 2009 -- the same day as the notorious State Senate coup -- a group of state senators began hearings on the Commission on Judicial Conduct and New York's system for disciplining attorneys. During the hearings, witnesses testified as to how the state's judicial watchdog group had ignored their complaints about judges and rebuffed their attempts to ascertain what happened to their complaints. Overall, many said, they were left feeling helpless before the justice system.
On Sept. 24, 2009 another hearing was held in Manhattan. The parade of witnesses with complaints about judges who allegedly flout the law, hold grudges against lawyers and levy absurdly large fines for perceived slights continued. In fact so many people wanted to testify on the matter that a third meeting was scheduled for Dec. 16, 2009.
That hearing never took place. A notice was issued that the hearing had been cancelled and would be rescheduled. It never was.
No findings were issued, no committee report was put together and no task force was called to investigate as some senators had suggested while reacting to testimony.
What happened? According to Senate Minority Leader John Sampson who headed the proceedings, he got too busy. “We started these hearings right when the coup happened. I believe that it was just the demands I had as leader. I couldn’t do everything,” he said. Sampson was anointed leader of the Democratic conference after the coup and continued to lead it after the Democrats returned to power. Many other Senate hearings continued during and after the coup.
In the two years since, no one has held any additional hearings on judicial accountability, but critics say the issue has not gone away. Observers and many people who have had bad experiences say the state's judicial watchdog ignores major complaints to focus on infractions of low-level judges, dismisses many worthy complaints and does all this in secrecy.

When Judges Misbehave

The Commission on Judicial Conduct is tasked with accepting complaints against judges and investigating complaints deemed meritorious. But a number of critics say the commission investigates lower level town judges for small infractions while ignoring repeated complaints against higher ranking judges such as those on the state Supreme Court. The Commission on Judicial Conduct has 11 members, each of whom serves a renewable four-year term. The governor appoints four members, the chief judge three and the speaker of the Assembly, the minority leader of the Assembly, the temporary president of the Senate (the majority leader) and the minority leader of the Senate each appoint one.
Of the governor's appointees, one must be a judge, and one must be a member of the state bar. The chief judge must appoint a justice of the Appellate Division, a judge who is not from the Court of Appeals or Appellate Division, and one who is a justice of a town or village court. Legislative leaders may not appoint anyone who has served as a judge.
Saratoga Family Court Judge Gilbert Abramson was the only judge removed by the commission in 2010. He allegedly made comments about a woman’s shirt that were “full of sexual innuendo.”
Two other judges resigned while under investigation. One had approved of anti-semetic comments in court, the other hadn’t bothered to sentence 100 people who had been convicted. Twelve judges were censured last year for a variety of reasons.
A number of observers, including commission members feel that the commission is far too reserved in its disciplining of judges. Albany Family Court Judge Gerald Maney tried to use his position to get out of a driving while intoxicated charge and yet he kept his seat. But critics say even more serious allegations are ignored -- ones about cases being fixed, rights being ignored and clear conflicts of interest.

Watchng the Watchdog?

So what came out of the hours of testimony, the money, time and miles witnesses spent getting to Albany, the risk lawyers took by complaining about judges in a public forum?
In 2010 Sampson began pushing a piece of legislation that would open judicial disciplinary hearings to the public -- not the actual complaints against judges, but the proceedings that take place after the commission has found sufficient reason to proceed against a judge. Proceedings such as these are open to the public in 35 other states. In New York, the proceedings are public only if the judge waives the right to a private hearing and agrees to have the accusations aired in public. Information about cases that result in disciplinary action are available to the public after a decision has been made.
Robert Tembjeckian, administrator and counsel to the Commission on Judicial Conduct, supports making the proceedings public. But he points out that no one is exactly in a rush to act on such legislation. “There is a preoccupation with economic and budgetary issues. At the moment it doesn’t seem to be a major concern," he said, adding, "The best case to move it forward is hopefully one house will see fit to have public hearings, generate momentum and public discussion.”
Sampson says he may initiate hearings on the Commission on Judicial Conduct early next year. “Reforms are necessary. Lady Justice is supposed to be blind but she has a hole in her blindfold and her scales are not balanced. There is a call out there [for hearings],” Sampson said. Sampson said he plans to start early in the year, and thinks he will enjoy the support of Gov. Andrew Cuomo. “I know our governor is all for reform. He believes people lost faith in our government and he wants to restore it, so I know this is something governor would truly support.” Cuomo’s office did not return calls for comment.
While Sampson may be prepared to hold hearings, other supporters of the measure aren’t exactly chomping at the bit. Dennis Hawkins, executive director of The Fund for Modern Courts, says the economy has led his group to focus on court budgets and working for judicial pay raises. He expects the budget to be a major focus during the 2012 session as well. “Sometimes larger issues block out other issues,” he said.
Peter Barlet, president of the New York State Magistrate’s Association, said his organization has no position on the issue but said making hearings public could “be a concern among judges who have to run for office.” He said opponents could use baseless cases as ammunition against sitting judges.

Case Dismissed

Despite the talk about opening hearings, that was not the key concern of a majority of the people who testified in 2009. “None of those people said they lacked confidence in the commission because hearings weren’t open,” said Elena Sassower, director of the Center for Judicial Accountability, a group that describes itself as "a national nonpartisan, nonprofit, citizens’ organization documenting how judges break the law and get away with it." Instead, Sassower said, "They lack confidence because their detailed, documented complaints were dismissed without reason and they were told the reasons were confidential.
A majority of the testimony focused on complaints the commission decided not to pursue. Attorney Regina Felton described how one judge routinely altered the court record, failed to file motions and repeatedly fined her large amounts. Since these motions were not filed. Felton had difficulty appealing them. Eventually when the judge demanded she pay $6,700 in fines Felton told the judge she had appealed, but he sent her to Rikers Island where she spent 11 days. Other complainants detailed how judges who oversaw their cases had conflicts of interest thanks to business relationships.
Currently there is no way to judge how the commission performs its duties when it comes to investigating meritorious cases, because all complaints are secret.
In 1989 then State Comptroller Edward Regan attempted to audit the Commission on Judicial Conduct. The report that came of the attempt was titled “Not Accountable to the Public: Resolving Charges Against Judges is Cloaked in Secrecy.”
"The commission has denied our request for access to confidential files and has refused to propose legislation to open its records to my office," Regan said in a statement accompanying the report. "As a result, my auditors cannot determine if the commission is complying with applicable state laws and regulations." Regan added, "The potential exists that the commission could be abusing its authority by wrongfully dismissing complaints against judges without cause and justification."
The only group pushing to actually make these complaints available to the public is the Center for Judicial Accountability. Sassower said, "Making the hearings public is like snow in the wintertime. Opening hearings will only give us an idea of what is going on with a handful of complaints, not addressing the 95 percent that do not result in an investigation."
Sassower says she has a good idea about the number of complaints the commission gets and does not act on, because she encourages complainants to forward their grievances to her organization. Sassower’s group has brought suit against the commission a number of times, each case has failed and she has since been barred by the judiciary from bringing any further cases.
Sassower says the commission routinely ignores meritorious cases and even destroys complaints it has held for five years, thereby making it impossible to track a pattern of complaints against judges who serve long terms. She wants the veil of secrecy to be lifted so that the public can see whether the commission is doing its job.

The Power of the Purse

The center has recently started pushing its case in a new way: attaching the issue to the very sensitive topic of judicial pay raises.
The Special Commission on Judicial Compensation was created by a 2010 law that mandates the group recommend salaries for judges. This year, the group issued a report recommending a 27 percent pay increase. The recommendation is binding and will go into effect next year unless the legislature blocks it. Late last month Sassower’s group issued its own report, which said the increase should not be given and charged that that the testimony given to the Senate in 2009 adds up to “evidence of systemic corruption” that “disqualifies judges from pay raises by a constitutional bar.”
Other groups that work on court issues are loathe to tie judicial pay raises to increasing transparency at the Commission for Judicial Conduct. After all, those same groups have been pushing for judicial pay raises for years.
“I don’t think that’s the way government works,” said Dennis Hawkins of the Fund for Modern Courts. “That seems like a way of coercion by the legislature against the judiciary. We need to keep the judiciary a separate, independent branch of government. Judges don’t have the ability to change the Commission on Public Conduct, so we shouldn’t be penalizing people who aren’t in charge of it.”
Others disagree with the very idea of opening the records. Tembjeckian, the commission’s administrator and counsel, says that the promise of confidentiality regarding complaints made against judges is “important and explicit. The statutory mandate precludes that even a grand jury cannot subpoena commission records. You are innocent until proven guilty.”
But Sassower argues that it is public record when a judge is sued. She notes that she has tried to get members of the press to write about the many complaints she has collected over the years, but to no avail. “The media is not running to cover complaints against judges. The fear is baseless.”
Sassower has distributed her report to the office of Chief Justice Jonathan Lippman, the governor and the heads of the legislature. She is currently awaiting response.



Thursday, January 19, 2012

Supreme Court Declines Cases on Student Internet Speech

The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday declined to take up major appeals involving student free speech rights on the Internet.
One appeal encompassed two cases decided in June 2011 by the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit, in Philadelphia.
The appeal in Blue Mountain School District v. Snyder (No. 11-502) involves a 3rd Circuit decision that said students who ridiculed their principals online could not be punished by school authorities because the speech was created off campus and did not substantially disrupt schools.
The 3rd Circuit held in the Blue Mountain case that a Pennsylvania middle school student's 2007 MySpace parody depicting her principal as a sex addict and a pedophile was so outrageous that no one could have taken it seriously.
In a companion case, Layshock v. Hermitage School District, the 3rd Circuit court overturned the discipline of a Pennsylvania high school student who in 2005 had created a fake MySpace profile of his principal on a computer at his grandmother's house. The phony profile played on the principal's purported interest in "big" things, such as smoking a "big blunt," being a "big steroid freak," having stolen a "big keg," and having been drunk a "big number of times."
The 3rd Circuit court found that the profile did not create a substantial disruption in school, and the court rejected the school district's arguments that other facts created a nexus between the parody and the school.
The joint appeal on behalf of the Blue Mountain and Hermitage school districts told the justices that the cases presented "important and urgent First Amendment questions regarding the scope of school officials' authority over student online speech."
"At the moment, school officials are stuck between a rock and a hard place," the appeal said. "They are responsible for protecting students and teachers from online harassment, but in doing so, they might trigger a lawsuit from a student claiming that his or her First Amendment rights have been violated. School officials cannot afford to wait any longer for a definitive answer."
Meanwhile, an appeal in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools (No. 11-461) involved a West Virginia student who was disciplined for creating a MySpace page targeting not an administrator but another student at her high school.
Kara Kowalski was a student at Musselman High School, in Berkeley County, W.Va., in 2005 when she created a MySpace page that suggested another female student had herpes. School officials concluded that Kowalski had created a "hate" website in violation of school policies against harassment, bullying, and intimidation. She was suspended from school for five days and given a "social suspension" of 90 days, meaning she was barred from certain school activities, including the cheerleading squad.
Kowalski sued under the First Amendment, but both a federal district court and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, in Richmond, Va., upheld school administrators. The 4th Circuit said in a July 2011 decision that "school administrators are becoming increasingly alarmed by the phenomenon" of harassment and bullying, and that "where such speech has a sufficient nexus with the school, the Constitution is not written to hinder school administrators' good faith efforts to address the problem."
In her appeal to the Supreme Court, Kowalski said, "This court has never addressed the appropriate First Amendment test for student speech that occurs entirely off school premises."
The justices declined on Jan. 17 to hear the cases without comment or recorded dissent.

'Abandoned by Counsel,' Death Row Inmate Gets Another Hearing


""The client bears the risk of all attorney errors…regardless of the egregiousness of the mistake," Justice Scalia said.

US Supreme Court Orders New Hearing For Morgan County Convict

Cory Maples
Gets Another Hearing

The National Law Journal, 01-19-2012 on the error of Cory Maples' Attorneys at Sullivan & Cromwell  to file a timely appeal of his death sentence:
""The client bears the risk of all attorney errors…regardless of the egregiousness of the mistake," Justice Scalia said.
WASHINGTON - The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on Jan. 18 that an Alabama death row inmate should not be penalized for missing a crucial appeal deadline when the error was caused by his pro bono lawyers from Sullivan & Cromwell.
The 7-2 ruling in Maples v. Thomas, 10-63, brings an end to a "lawyer's nightmare" case that showed how a series of law firm mailroom and notice errors as well as the departure of two associates could nearly result in a client's execution. In excruciating detail, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg recited the "uncommon facts" and mishaps that amounted to abandonment of convicted murderer Cory Maples by his Sullivan & Cromwell lawyers at the precise moment when Mr. Maples faced a filing deadline for his state post-conviction appeal.
"Abandoned by counsel, Maples was left unrepresented at a critical time for his state post-conviction petition, and he lacked a clue of any need to protect himself pro se," wrote Justice Ginsburg. "In these circumstances, no just system would lay the default at Maples' death-cell door."
In a concurrence, Justice Samuel Alito Jr. described Sullivan & Cromwell as "one of the country's most prestigious and expensive" law firms, and said what befell Mr. Maples was "a veritable perfect storm of misfortune."
Law firms usually rejoice at being cited by the Supreme Court, but not in this vein. Asked for comment on the decision, Sullivan & Cromwell released a brief statement: "We're pleased that Mr. Maples won his appeal in the Supreme Court."
Former Solicitor General Gregory Garre, who represents Mr. Maples, was "thrilled" by the decision in the case, but the Latham & Watkins partner declined to comment on its impact.
Because it represented such a serious breach of a lawyer's duty to a client, the Maples case struck a chord with many lawyers and law firms as it made its way to the high court.
"No lawyer would ever want a client to suffer the ultimate punishment because of being abandoned by counsel," said Jonathan Franklin of Fulbright & Jaworski, who filed a brief in the case on behalf of the Constitution Project and the Cato Institute on Mr. Maples' behalf. "This was the ultimate disservice to a client."
In terms of legal doctrine, the ruling also may open the door to more claims by death-row inmates citing ineffective assistance by post-conviction counsel. The Supreme Court's 1991 ruling in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, seemed to foreclose such claims previously.
The Court's decision on Jan. 18 overturned a ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that found the circumstances of the missed deadline could not overcome the procedural default that resulted. The case returns to lower courts for a hearing on whether the error prejudiced his case, after which the merits of his ineffective assistance claim could be considered.
Accused of a double murder in 1997, Mr. Maples was represented at trial by two court-appointed lawyers, only one of whom had experience in capital cases. Mr. Maples was convicted and sentenced to death. Justice Ginsburg noted disapprovingly that Alabama, "nearly alone among the states," does not guarantee post-conviction legal representation for indigent defendants. Instead, it depends on volunteer efforts, often by large out-of-state law firms.
In Mr. Maples' case, Sullivan & Cromwell New York associates Jaasi Munanka and Clara Ingen-Housz worked on his appeal, which cited ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Alabama rules require a local attorney as well, so Huntsville lawyer John Butler was hired for that role, though from the outset, he told the two Sullivan lawyers he would not deal with the substance of the case.
In 2002, both Sullivan lawyers left the firm for positions that precluded continuing to represent Mr. Maples—Mr. Munanka clerked for a federal judge and Ms. Ingen-Housz went to work at the European Commission. But neither lawyer told Mr. Maples they were leaving, nor sought permission to withdraw from Alabama courts. The firm did not notify the Alabama court of any substitutions. So when the trial court first denied Mr. Maples' appeal, notice to the lawyers was sent to Sullivan, where the mailroom returned the envelopes unopened. Mr. Butler received notice, but did not act on it. The court clerk made no attempt to track down the lawyers.
"Meanwhile, the clock ticked on Maples' appeal," wrote Justice Ginsburg. The deadline expired, and a month later an Alabama assistant attorney general notified Mr. Maples himself. Mr. Maples then contacted his mother, who got in touch with Sullivan & Cromwell. A new set of lawyers there petitioned the Alabama court to re-state the deadline, but their plea was denied.
Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented. Noting that defendants have no constitutional right to be represented by counsel in post-conviction proceedings.
"The client bears the risk of all attorney errors…regardless of the egregiousness of the mistake," Justice Scalia said.
New hearing for US death row inmate in 'returned mail' case
In a 7-2 vote, the highest US court ordered a new hearing for convicted murderer Cory Maples in the case, reversing a lower court ruling.
Maples was sentenced to death by an Alabama court in 1997 for murdering two of his friends after a night of drugs and binge drinking.
He unsuccessfully filed a petition for relief after the conviction, claiming that his trial lawyer had failed to offer evidence about his mental health, alcohol and drug history.
A new legal team was sent notice that Maples had 42 days to file an appeal, but by the time letter was sent out, they were no longer employed by their New York firm, and the letter was returned unopened.
As well as failing to file his appeal by required date, he was also denied an extension -- a decision appealed to the US top court.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in the court opinion that the lower court erred in its ruling, and that the condemned man could not be held accountable for the mistake.
Ginsburg wrote that Maples had believed that his attorneys were "vigilantly representing him," when in fact they "had abandoned the case without leave of court, without informing Maples they could no longer represent him, and without securing any recorded substitution of counsel."
"No just system would lay the default at Maples' death cell door," Ginsburg added in the court opinion.
The former civil liberties attorney also decried the low eligibility requirements that Alabama sets for lawyers appointed to represent indigent defendants in death penalty cases, as well as the paltry pay these lawyers often receive.
Maples, who claimed that his court-appointed lawyers did an inadequate job defending him, was represented before the justices by a team of lawyers led by Gregory Garre, a former US solicitor general.
During arguments before the Supreme Court back in October, Garre stressed that his client was not asking to be freed from prison, simply that his case be heard and decried the "extraordinary and shocking" circumstances at work -- especially in a "capital case when an individual life is at stake."
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented.
"If the interest of fairness justifies our excusing Maples? procedural default here, it does so whenever a defendant?s procedural default is caused by his attorney," Scalia wrote in the dissent.
"That is simply not the law -- and cannot be, if the states are to have an orderly system of criminal litigation conducted by counsel," he wrote.

Saturday, December 31, 2011

MacPherson v JPMorgan Chase: Fair Credit Reporting Act Pre-empts State Law Claims

United States Court of Appeals,Second Circuit

LINK

MacPHERSON v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK

Sean Stewart MacPHERSON, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,Defendant–Appellee.

Docket No. 10–3722–cv.
Argued: Sept. 22, 2011. -- December 23, 2011

Before POOLER, B.D. PARKER, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
Sean Stewart Macpherson, pro se, Redding, CT.Noah A. Levine (Daniel S. Volchok, on the brief), Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, NY, and Washington, D.C.; (Thomas Edward Stagg and Debra Lynne Wabnik, Stagg, Terenzi, Confusione & Wabnik, LLP, Garden City, NY, on the brief), for Appellee.

Proceeding pro se, Sean Stewart Macpherson appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Thompson, J.), dismissing his state common law tort claims against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. Because we agree that the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F), preempts Macpherson's state law claims against Chase, we affirm the district court's judgment.

Macpherson alleges that Chase willfully and maliciously provided false information about his finances to Equifax, a consumer credit reporting agency. Based on these reports, Equifax reduced his credit score, to his detriment. Macpherson sued Chase in state court in Connecticut for this alleged conduct, asserting state common law claims against Chase for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Chase removed the suit to federal court and moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Macpherson's claims are preempted by FCRA. In a careful and thorough decision, the district court agreed and granted Chase's motion. No. 3:09CV 1774, 2010 WL 3081278 (D.Conn. Aug. 5, 2010). Macpherson timely appealed.

The sole issue on appeal is whether FCRA preempts Macpherson's state law claims. We review de novo a district court's application of preemption principles. Drake v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 458 F.3d 48, 56 (2d Cir.2006). Chase contends, and the district court held, that Macpherson's claims are preempted by § 1681t(b)(1)(F) of FCRA. This section, a general preemption provision enacted in 1996—over twenty years after FCRA first took effect—provides, in relevant part:

No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State—
(1) with respect to any subject matter regulated under—

(F) section 1681s–2 of this title, relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies․
15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F). Macpherson acknowledges that his allegations of false reporting concern conduct regulated by § 1681s–2. Read literally, therefore, § 1681t(b)(1)(F) bars Macpherson's state law tort claims.

Macpherson contends, however, that his claims survive the 1996 preemption provision by virtue of another section of the statute, § 1681h(e). Enacted in 1970 as a part of the original legislation, § 1681h(e) provides, as relevant here:

[N]o consumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the reporting of information against ․ any person who furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency, ․ except as to false information furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.

15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (emphasis supplied). Notwithstanding the broad language of the 1996 amendment, Macpherson maintains that § 1681h(e) amounts to an explicit authorization of certain state common law tort claims that are based on “false information furnished with malice or willful intent to injure.” He urges us to reconcile the conflict that his reading of § 1681h(e) engenders by holding that the 1996 amendment preempts only state statutes, and not state common law actions, that are inconsistent with FCRA.

In Premium Mortgage Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., 583 F.3d 103 (2d Cir.2009), we expressly rejected the argument that § 1681t(b) preempts only state statutory law. Id. at 106. We adopted instead a more literal reading of the phrase “[n]o requirement or prohibition”—a reading that was endorsed by a plurality of the Supreme Court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), in its discussion of a similar preemption argument: “The phrase ‘[n]o requirement or prohibition’ sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and common law; to the contrary, those words easily encompass obligations that take the form of common-law rules.” Id. at 521. The same section and introductory language—“[n]o requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State”—applies here, and our holding in Premium Mortgage forecloses Macpherson's limited reading of the 1996 amendment.

Moreover, and more importantly, Macpherson's basic premise is false: the 1996 provision, § 1681t(b)(1)(F), is not in conflict with § 1681h(e), and § 1681h(e) does not insulate state tort actions from preemption. As the Seventh Circuit recently explained in Purcell v. Bank of America, 659 F.3d 622 (7th Cir.2011), “[s]ection 1681h(e) preempts some state claims that could arise out of reports to credit agencies; § 1681t(b)(1)(F) [simply] preempts more of these claims.” Id. at 625 (emphasis supplied). Put differently, the operative language in § 1681h(e) provides only that the provision does not preempt a certain narrow class of state law claims; it does not prevent the later-enacted § 1681t(b)(1)(F) from accomplishing a more broadly-sweeping preemption. As the Purcell court persuasively reasoned:
Section 1681h(e) does not create a right to recover for wilfully false reports; it just says that a particular paragraph does not preempt claims of that stripe. Section 1681h(e) was enacted in 1970.

Twenty-six years later, in 1996, Congress added § 1681t(b)(1)(F) to the United States Code. The same legislation also added § 1681 s–2. The extra federal remedy in § 1681 s–2 was accompanied by extra preemption in § 1681t(b)(1)(F), in order to implement the new plan under which reporting to credit agencies would be supervised by state and federal administrative agencies rather than judges. Reading the earlier statute, § 1681h(e), to defeat the later-enacted system in § 1681s–2 and § 1681t(b)(1)(F), would contradict fundamental norms of statutory interpretation.
Id. We agree.

Having determined that § 1681h(e) is compatible with § 1681t(b)(1)(F), and that Macpherson's state law claims are preempted by the plain language of § 1681t(b)(1)(F), we need not address Macpherson's remaining statutory interpretation arguments.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Friday, December 30, 2011

Attorney Frederic Powell Disbarred For Grand Larceny, Possession of a Forged Instrument, and Attempted Bribery

Is Stealing Money by an Attorney Legal Malpractice?
LINK

While theft by an attorney may be many things, it is questionable whether it might be called legal malpractice. In B & R Consol., L.L.C. v Zurich Am. Ins. Co. 2011 NY Slip Op 51142(U) ; Decided on June 22, 2011 ; Supreme Court, Nassau County ; DeStefano, J. we see an upside-down mirror image of the usual legal malpractice case. Here plaintiff's attorneys are well known legal malpractice defense counsel, plaintiff in the underlying legal malpractice case is suing the malpractice insurer, and the argument is over whether the insurance policy covers the alleged acts. Here, for the moment it does.

"In an action filed on November 6, 2008, encaptioned B & R Consolidated, L.L.C. v Frederic A. Powell, Esq. and Robin Powell, Index No. 020049/08 (the "underlying action"), B & R asserted, inter alia, causes of action in fraud, unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty based upon an admission by attorney Frederick A. Powell ("Powell") that he "stole four hundred and fifty thousand ($450,000.00) dollars of B & R's money from his escrow account for other personal projects'" and did this "without any authorization from B & R" (Ex. "1" to Plaintiff's Opposition). Specifically, it was alleged in the complaint that:
Unbeknownst to B & R, [Powell] received the money from the repayment of a mortgage owned by B & R in June of 2007. [Powell] neglected to inform B & R that the money had been received until September 2008, more than an entire year later! Instead, [Powell] made periodic payments to B & R under the guise of interest payments being made by a third party on the mortgage held by B & R
Accordingly, the Court finds unrebutted plaintiff's proof that Powell took possession of funds belonging to the plaintiff, hid that fact from it, and then lost or misappropriated those funds for his own use. This constitutes an established breach of fiduciary duty owed to B & R by Powell as its attorney. Further, damages resulting from that breach have been shown as a result of the [*4]misappropriation of the clients' funds, which is distinct from any claim for negligence or legal malpractice. Summary judgment therefore is granted to the plaintiff on its third and fifth causes of action, breach of "the fiduciary duty of care", and "of loyalty", as they most closely comport with the foregoing authority regarding breach of fiduciary duty generally. The Court notes that such a breach would also allow for a recovery for any attorney's fees that were improperly charged as being incident the to [sic] breach rendering the continued pursuit of the negligence and malpractice causes of action unnecessary. Summary judgment is therefore denied as to these claims. "
"The Insurer argues that liability in the underlying action was not based upon Powell's rendition of legal services but, rather, on his misappropriation of B & R's funds and, thus, the Insurer has no obligation to indemnify. In the underlying action, Justice Palmieri stated in his decision that "the amended complaint is framed in terms of negligence, malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty to Powell. This in turn is premised on bad advice from Powell as attorney and a failure to keep B & R informed of the true status of its loan to Lyons" (Ex. "7" to Plaintiff's Opposition at p. 5).
Under the circumstances, and considering that the causes of action asserting breach of fiduciary duty are based upon the same facts constituting the causes of action alleging negligence and legal malpractice, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Powell's conduct falls outside the scope of risk covered by the policy (Ex. "7" to Plaintiff's Opposition at p 8; see Ulico Casualty Co., v Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, 56 AD3d 1 [1st Dept 2008]; Burkhart, Wexler & Hirschberg, LLP v Liberty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 60 AD3d 884 [2d Dept 2009]).[FN3] "

 

Long Island real-estate lawyer disbarred after bribery attempt

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NEW YORK, Dec 30 (Reuters) - A Long Island real-estate attorney was formally banned from practicing law in New York after he admitted to trying to pay a government official $250 to expedite his request for public information on a property.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, on Thursday granted a motion by the Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District to disbar Frederic Powell, who pleaded guilty in March to grand larceny, criminal possession of a forged instrument and attempted bribery.
According to the court record, Powell admitted to stealing property worth more than $50,000 and to putting a person's name on a mortgage without her knowledge or consent.
He was also caught in 2010 trying to bribe a Hempstead Township clerk to speed up a request he made under the Freedom of Information Law for information on a piece of property.
According to a statement from Nassau County District Attorney Kathleen Rice, Powell was told by the clerk that it would take up to five days to process his request. Powell told the clerk that he needed the information that day and put a $100 bill on the counter, asking if it would be possible to expedite the process.
After the clerk said that there was nothing she could do to speed up the request, Powell pushed a second $100 bill across the counter, according to prosecutors. When the clerk refused, saying she would call him when she received the requested information, Powell crumpled up and threw a $50 bill at the clerk.
The clerk returned all of the money to Powell before he left, the DA said. A spokeswoman for Rice said that Powell's case is still active and that he has not yet been sentenced.
Powell could not immediately be reached for comment on Friday. He did not oppose the grievance committee's motion for disbarment and did not respond to the disciplinary action, according to the court ruling.
The case is In the Matter of Frederic Powell, in the Supreme Court for the State of New York, Appellate Division: Second Judicial Department, No. 2009-04002.
For the disciplinary committee: Daniel Mitola of Hauppauge, N.Y.
(Reporting by Jessica Dye)
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