Sarah Palin's Defamation Lawsuit Against The New York Times Will Go To Trial in February

Sarah Palin

Sarah Palin Gets Libel Trial Against New York Times

A federal judge rejects the paper's summary judgment motion and sets a trial for February.

AUGUST 28, 2020 3:57pm PT by Eriq Gardner

Sarah Palin will proceed to trial against The New York Times next February, pandemic permitting. On Friday, U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff rejected the paper's summary judgment motion in a big libel case over an editorial about gun violence. The New York federal judge concludes that she had provided enough evidence to establish actual malice on the part of the paper's former op/ed chief.

The editorial linked one of Palin's political action committee ads to a 2011 mass shooting that severely wounded then-Arizona Congresswoman Gabby Giffords. James Bennet, the writer of the editorial, wanted to make a point about a climate of political incitement, but The New York Times quickly made a correction acknowledging that no link had been established between Palin's ad and the shooting.

Rakoff had previously dismissed the suit in Aug. 2017, writing at the time that "in the exercise of that freedom, mistakes will be made, some of which will be hurtful to others."

The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals then revived the case based on Rakoff's rash conclusion that Palin couldn't establish actual malice.

Back at the lower court, Palin aimed for something even greater than a win against The New York Times. She aimed to basically upend a half century of jurisprudence in libel cases by overthrowing the actual malice standard — that being how public figures must demonstrate awareness of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.

Rakoff won't give that to Palin.

"Perhaps recognizing that this Court is not free to disregard preced3ent even if it were so inclined (which in this case it distinctly is not), [Palin] offers what she calls an alternative argument: that 'actual malice rule arose from distinguishable facts and should not be applied,'" writes Rakoff. "More precisely, [Palin's] argument is that the actual malice rule, which was first articulated more than half a century ago in the days before the Internet and social media, has run its course and should no longer govern our contemporary media landscape. Binding precedent does not, however, come with an experiation date. To the extend plaintiff believes the actual malice requirement ought to be abolished, she should make that argument to the appropriate court — the Supreme Court."

At the Supreme Court, Justice Clarence Thomas wants to get rid of actual malice, but whether that would ever happen is a subject for another day. In the meantime, she needs to establish actual malice to prevail.

Fortunately for Palin, Rakoff looks at the evidence and decides there's enough there, especially when viewing it in a light that is most favorable to her. In particular, he points to strong evidence that Bennet may have recklessly disregarded truth by failing to read stuff that the paper's researchers had been sending him on the topic of the shooter. The judge adds that his failure to investigate could support an inference he purposely avoided the truth.

Then again, it's no slam dunk and will be decided at a trial that Rakoff sets for February.

In the opinion (read here), Rakoff writes "there is considerable evidence that defendants mount to support the notion that Bennet simply drew the innocent inference that a political circular showing crosshairs over a Congressperson's district might well invite an increased climate of violence with respect to her. But, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence shows Bennet came up with an angle for the Editorial, ignored the articles brought to his attention that were inconsistent with his angle, disregarded the results the Williamson research that he commissioned, and ultimately made the point he set out to make in reckless disregard of the truth."

Notably, Bennet resigned as opinion editor in June after a controversy over publishing an opinion piece by U.S. Senator Tom Cotton that called for a military response to civic unrest in American cities. That article spurred a rebellion by much of the paper's staff. Bennet later acknowledged that this piece hadn't been edited carefully enough.

Sarah Palin Defamation Suit Against New York Times Can Move Forward, Federal Judge Rules

by Bruce Haring, Deadline, AugustAugust 28, 2020

Sarah Palin’s defamation suit against the New York Times can move forward, a federal judge said on Friday.

US District Court Judge Jed Rakoff rejected the Times bid to dismiss the suit, which arose over a 2017 editorial Palin claims wrongly linked her to the 2011 mass shooting of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords. Palin was a 2008 Vice Presidential candidate and is a former Governor of Alaska.

Rakoff today said there was “sufficient evidence to allow a rational finder of fact to find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.” While Rakoff allowed that much of Palin’s case was circumstantial, it was strong enough that a jury might find the Times and its former editorial page editor James Bennet acted with “actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.”

Rakoff scheduled a Feb. 1, 2021 trial. Read the court documents here.

“We’re disappointed in the ruling but are confident we will prevail at trial when a jury hears the facts,” Times spokeswoman Danielle Rhoades-Ha said.

The 2017 editorial came after an Alexandria, Virginia mass shooting that wounded four people, including then-House Majority Whip Steve Scalise. The editorial said that the 2011 Giffords shooting came after Palin’s political action committee had circulated a map that put 20 Democrats, including Giffords, under “stylized cross hairs.”

The Times later issued a correction, saying there was no link between “political rhetoric” and the Giffords shooting. Bennet said he had not intended to blame Palin.

Rakoff disagreed. He said Bennet’s substantial rewrite of an earlier draft, and admission he was aware “incitement” could mean a call to violence, could suggest actual malice. Rakoff also noted that Bennet may have ignored materials that were not in step with his “angle” on the editorial, something that could be construed as a reckless disregard for the truth. .

The case is Palin v New York Times Co et al, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 17-04853.

Rakoff’s decision today comes after he originally dismissed Palin’s lawsuit soon after it was filed. The Second Circuit appeals court disagreed with Rakoff’s original ruling, setting the stage for today’s reconsidered decision.

In its ruling (read it here), the three-judge US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded Rakoff’s original ruling, reached after hearing from testimony from Bennet, on procedural grounds. Therefore it did not offer an opinion on the merits of Palin’s case.

“The district court (Rakoff, J.), uncertain as to whether Palin’s complaint plausibly alleged all of the required elements of her defamation claim, held an evidentiary hearing to test the sufficiency of Palin’s pleadings. Following the hearing, and without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment, the district court relied on evidence adduced at that hearing to dismiss Palin’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We find that the district court erred in relying on facts outside the pleadings to dismiss the complaint. We further conclude that Palin’s Proposed Amended Complaint plausibly states a claim for defamation and may proceed to full discovery.”

Bennet testified in the unusual hearing that he did not intend to draw a “causal link” between the 2011 shooting that left Giffords severely wounded and a notorious “crosshairs” map distributed at the time by a Sarah Palin PAC.

Listening to Bennet’s testimony and considering the circumstances of law and otherwise, Rakoff made the call that Palin’s case could not effectively demonstrate actual malice, as would be required to move the matter forward.

Writing the Second Circuit’s ruling, Judge John M. Walker noted that it was clear Rakoff “viewed the hearing as a way to more expeditiously decide whether Palin had a viable way to establish actual malice. But, despite the flexibility that is accorded district courts to streamline proceedings and manage their calendars, district courts are not free to bypass rules of procedure that are carefully calibrated to ensure fair process to both sides.”

He’ll Eventually Prevail, but Flynn Stands to Lose the Mandamus Fight

Michael Flynn

by Andrew C. McCarthy, National Review, August 15, 2020

General Michael Flynn is going to lose the battle. That was the takeaway from Tuesday’s hearing before the D.C. Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals. Flynn will eventually win the war, but President Trump’s first national-security adviser is still in a slog, and there are more scraps ahead.

The battle in question is Flynn’s petitioning of the D.C. Circuit to issue a writ of mandamus against federal district judge Emmet Sullivan. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. It is something of a last resort, when a judge is acting so lawlessly that the damage could be incurable if a higher court fails to intervene. Here, the writ would direct Judge Sullivan to end his highly irregular inquiry into the Justice Department’s motion to dismiss the case against Flynn and just grant that motion, as the law requires.

Flynn will eventually prevail in having the case dismissed, because he has an ace in the hole: If all else fails, the president will pardon him. Meanwhile, maybe Sullivan will grant the dismissal motion, as the judge’s lawyer hinted at the hearing. If he does not, maybe there will still be time for Flynn to win a reversal on appeal — an eventuality that some circuit judges suggested but that, practically speaking, may hinge on whether President Trump is reelected (if Trump loses, he’d have to pardon by January 20). Naturally, Flynn would rather not go the pardon route; there is more vindication if the case is formally dismissed on the motion of the prosecuting authority that brought it.

The specter of a pardon has a distorting effect on the proceedings. It has emboldened Sullivan — an erratic, irascible man who has been a judge for 36 years — to unleash his inner crazy, knowing it won’t make a difference in the end. The circuit judges are more tentative than they might otherwise be in reining him in.

That is this analyst’s conclusion after listening to Tuesday’s oral arguments, a nearly four-hour affair. Counsel for Flynn, the Justice Department, and Sullivan presented arguments to, and were exactingly questioned by, ten appellate judges. Though designed to be a face-to-face court proceeding, the en banc (or full court) hearing was conducted by audio teleconference. Things went fairly smoothly, though there were the occasional technical glitches and cacophony of competing voice-overs to which the COVID-19 era has inured us.

Flynn won’t win, but he should. He did, in fact, win the first round, before a three-judge panel. This divided ruling was vacated, however, when the full D.C. Circuit — ten judges, because an eleventh is recused — agreed to reconsider it, on the highly unusual motion of Sullivan, the district judge against whom the panel’s mandamus writ was issued.

Disqualification, a Red Herring
The fact that Sullivan himself moved for en banc review prompted the question of disqualification. The issue, however, seemed more intriguing in the run-up than it proved to be at the hearing.

As I recounted last weekend, the circuit, just a few days before the hearing, issued an order intimating that Judge Sullivan might need to recuse under the federal statute that governs disqualification. The order was cryptic, and an outsider never knows exactly what to make of such signals. Did it mean a critical mass of the judges were concerned, or was the full court merely humoring one or two of their colleagues who thought disqualification should be addressed? Or was the court hoping Sullivan would take the hint and recuse himself, sparing the appellate judges the unwelcome task of assessing his strange comportment?

In the event, it was a red herring. I had theorized that the circuit, by forcing Judge Sullivan to seek en banc review himself (when none of the appellate judges asked for it), had put him in the position of being a litigant; the law requires the disqualification of a judge who becomes a party to the case. But Sullivan’s counsel pointed out that it was the circuit’s own three-judge panel that initially ordered him to respond to Flynn’s mandamus petition — he was planning to ignore it, as he hoped the circuit would. And even though Sullivan did seek full-court review of the panel’s ruling, how could the court compel him to act like a litigant and then pull the rug out from under him when he complied? This seemed to satisfy some of the judges, who pooh-poohed disqualification and conceded that Sullivan had not made himself a party in the case.

Another part of the statute requires a judge’s recusal any time his impartiality might be questioned. Yet neither the Justice Department nor Flynn had formally moved to disqualify Sullivan. That may seem odd to the layman, but it makes practical sense. As Emerson observed, “When you strike at a king, you must kill him.” Experienced litigants never seek a judge’s disqualification unless there is no alternative and they are certain to win on the issue — because if you lose, you are going to have one very angry judge deciding your fate.

Taking her cue from the circuit’s pre-hearing order, Flynn’s counsel, Sidney Powell, told the judges that Sullivan should be disqualified. But Flynn’s bridge is already burned. In stark contrast, the Justice Department has many other cases before Judge Sullivan. It has not sought his disqualification, and the topic was not mentioned in acting solicitor general Jeffrey Wall’s presentation; he gingerly weighed in on it only when prodded by Judge Karen Henderson (who was in the panel majority that ruled against Sullivan, and who seemed more interested in the recusal issue than did her colleagues). Wall took pains to say that Sullivan had not exhibited actual bias. He made a half-hearted nod in the direction of questioning Sullivan’s impartiality, but recusal was not a hill he was prepared to die on.

The Justice Department’s Mandamus Dance
The Justice Department’s reticence is not limited to recusal. More consequential is the fact that the solicitor general has never formally moved for a writ of mandamus against Sullivan. When asked about this, Wall brushed it off as an irrelevant technicality, just as he did two months ago when the petition was argued before the panel. He insists it’s not a big deal because the Justice Department has supported Flynn’s petition — albeit only after the panel asked for its input. But if it’s not a big deal . . . then why not file the petition? After all, some of the circuit judges are clearly annoyed about being asked to rebuke a fellow jurist when a party aggrieved by Sullivan’s conduct — the executive branch, whose constitutional power to end a prosecution is being usurped — never bothered to seek the writ. I suspect the cynic in the circuit judges (like the cynic in me) wonders whether Justice’s clever lawyers are trying to have it both ways — nudge the circuit into issuing the writ, but assure Sullivan that they never asked for the writ.

Wall is a superb lawyer, and he may be right that Justice has made exactly the same arguments it would have made if it had formally petitioned for the writ. But the solicitor general’s posture has the feel of gamesmanship. It has at least some of the judges miffed.

Judge Sullivan’s Alternative Universe
Beyond that, we need to distinguish two things: The merits of the mandamus petition versus the merits of Justice’s motion to dismiss the case — i.e., the motion Sullivan has failed to grant and signaled he would not grant, which is what prompted Flynn to seek mandamus.

Wall stressed that the panel’s ruling granting mandamus should have remained undisturbed. Never before, he asserted, has a district judge, on his own motion, been granted en banc reconsideration of such a panel ruling. The Justice Department’s research indicates that only one other judge has ever tried, and that judge was rebuffed. By contrast, Sullivan’s lawyer, Beth Wilkinson, emphasizes: Never before has a circuit court issued a writ of mandamus against a district judge who has not yet even conducted a hearing on a dismissal motion, much less denied it.

So, it’s a contest of the “never befores.”

Wilkinson’s claim returns us to the topic of gamesmanship. After she made her pitch on Sullivan’s behalf, one could detect a trace of pique in the unflappable Wall’s closing argument. Wilkinson is a very able advocate, but to hear her describe how Sullivan has presided over the case, after watching how Sullivan has presided over the case, was to be transported to an alternative universe.

In her argument, Wilkinson feigned astonishment that anyone could possibly imagine the highly experienced, well-respected judge would do anything other than follow the law — and if the law requires dismissal, well then, by God, how could anyone think he wouldn’t dismiss? Indeed, she tartly observed that Sullivan originally wanted to conduct his hearing on the Justice Department’s dismissal motion in mid-July; had Flynn not sought mandamus, had the Justice Department not gone along, and had the circuit had not indulged what she described as the baseless, overwrought petition, this case might have been over a month ago.

Sure.

If you’re keeping score, early in the proceedings, the highly experienced judge did not seem to have taken the few minutes he would have needed to review the file he’d inherited. Sullivan wildly implied that Flynn — a decorated 30-year combat commander, who is charged with a false-statements process crime that interviewing agents did not think he committed and that had no obstructive effect whatsoever on the Trump–Russia investigation — had “sold your country out” and might be guilty of “treason.” The judge eventually apologized, adding that he “felt terrible about that.” I’m sure that made General Flynn feel much better.

In more recent times, Sullivan has floated the nearly equally lunatic notion that Flynn should be prosecuted for contempt due to his “perjury” because — like a zillion other defendants, including an untold number during Sullivan’s long tenure — Flynn initially pled guilty but later moved to withdraw his plea and claimed innocence. In the interim, Sullivan appointed an amicus curiae (friend of the court), former federal judge John Gleeson, a partisan Democrat selected for the gig only after co-authoring a Washington Post op-ed that accused the Trump administration and its Justice Department of corruption in dropping Flynn’s case.

The role assigned to Gleeson by Sullivan is to argue against dismissal — i.e., to act as a court-appointed prosecutor against Flynn, under circumstances where the only authority with constitutional power to prosecute, the Justice Department, has announced it is dropping the case. Gleeson’s 73-page brief conveys that he expects to challenge the Justice Department’s explanation of its legal theory that Flynn is not guilty of the false-statements charge, its assessment of the strength of the case, its decision that pursuing the case would not be a meritorious expenditure of its resources, its internal deliberations about the case, and its motives for dismissing it — though Gleeson ultimately backtracked, at least for now, on the suggestion that he would subpoena witnesses and conduct additional factfinding.

Sullivan also invited other amici to weigh in, notwithstanding that there is no rule permitting amicus briefs in criminal cases (the defendant in such a case already has to contend with the limitless resources of the Justice Department). This was remarkable because, to quote a Judge Sullivan ruling, “The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for intervention by third parties in criminal cases”; consequently, the judge has denied dozens of applications to file amicus briefs, including in the Flynn case.

Yes indeedy, how could anyone possibly get the nutty idea that straight-arrow Sully plans to do anything other than follow the law and dismiss the case?

Not a Thought Crime
There is no doubt about the lawlessness of what Sullivan has contemplated doing. To state succinctly what I’ve covered in other columns (e.g., here), to the extent Rule 48(a) purports to require “leave of court” before the Justice Department may dismiss a case, it unconstitutionally infringes on the executive authority — at least in a case where the defendant agrees to a dismissal that will end the case with prejudice (i.e., where the prosecutor is not violating due process by dismissing to get a tactical advantage). In a case such as Flynn’s, the presiding judge must grant the dismissal.

During the argument, some circuit judges took umbrage at this image of the lower court reduced to a rubber stamp. But that is not Flynn’s or Justice’s doing; it is what happens when Congress enacts a constitutionally dubious rule that should not have brought the court into the dismissal equation in the first place.

That is why Flynn should win the case. But, to repeat, winning the case is different from winning the mandamus.

I italicized has contemplated a moment ago because, if I may analogize to penal law, a “thought crime” is not enough for mandamus. Yes, Judge Sullivan has set the stage for a travesty, but he has not actually done anything irreparable yet.

Reluctant to think ill of their longtime fellow jurist, most of the circuit judges seem prepared to suspend disbelief and accept Ms. Wilkinson’s assurance that Sullivan will follow the law. And even acting solicitor general Wall concedes that it is proper for a judge to hold some kind of hearing on a dismissal motion, although for nothing other than the limited purpose of making sure the judge understands the Justice Department’s rationale. (In Flynn’s case, it would also be proper to hold no hearing, given that the prosecution’s very detailed submission elucidates that no tactical advantage is sought over Flynn and shows that the Justice Department has proper reasons — even if Sullivan disagrees with them.)

A mandamus writ is supposed to issue only if there is no adequate alternative relief. Flynn can’t really make that showing because if Sullivan grants the dismissal motion, Flynn gets exactly the result he wants. The Justice Department could complain that the executive is already being damaged by the hearing process Sullivan is putting in place; but again, Justice did not seek mandamus. And if Sullivan retreats and grants the motion, the way Wilkinson suggests he might, Justice won’t have much to complain about.

On the other side of the mandamus ledger, the circuit has to be concerned that granting the writ would open the floodgates to other litigants who seek to appeal right away whenever the district judge allegedly makes an error. The regular, orderly appellate process calls for waiting until the end of the district court proceedings to raise all claims of error. Circuit Judge Merrick Garland seemed especially concerned that such a precedent could not easily be limited.

Back in Judge Sullivan’s Court
To summarize, I expect the full court will rule against mandamus, probably by a 7–3 or 8–2 vote, along the party lines of a circuit that tilts heavily Democratic. The two Republican appointees who formed the panel majority in favor of issuing the writ will no doubt dissent, and perhaps pick up another vote or two, but no more. It will be interesting to see whether a majority opinion, while denying the writ, admonishes Sullivan that a judge (a) should afford the executive branch a presumption of good faith, (b) should not second-guess the executive’s reasoning or probe its motives in dismissing a prosecution, and (c) may not appoint amici to serve as parallel prosecutors.

292

Once mandamus is denied, the Flynn case will be sent back to Judge Sullivan. Will he drag his feet to make General Flynn sweat it out? The circuit court indicated disapproval of that prospect. Will Sullivan, despite all the rabble-rousing, just grant the dismissal motion without much more fanfare, as his lawyer suggested he might? That would be a pleasant surprise, but I’m not holding my breath. Will the judge turn the hearing into a circus and try to put the Trump Justice Department on trial? It remains a possibility, though less of one if the circuit prudently warns against it. Will Sullivan deny the dismissal motion and perhaps even try to sentence Flynn? I have to think the Justice Department would petition for mandamus at that point, and its case would be strong. Or would Justice and/or Flynn then ask the judge to impose sentence quickly, rather than put it off for a few months? That way, if President Trump loses the November election, Flynn might still have time to appeal such lawlessness and get a reversal that would obviate the need for a pardon.

Lots of questions. They cannot be answered until the ball is back in Judge Sullivan’s court. Unfortunately, I’m convinced that the D.C. Circuit will soon toss it back there.

ANDREW C. MCCARTHY is a senior fellow at National Review Institute, an NR contributing editor, and author of BALL OF COLLUSION: THE PLOT TO RIG AN ELECTION AND DESTROY A PRESIDENCY. @andrewcmccarthy

Federal Appeals Court Rules That The PACER System Overcharges The Public

 

© iStock

OK! The first step is won, now we need to get Congress to approve making access free to all Courts' records. The public should not have to pay for public information.

Betsy Combier

betsy.combier@gmail.com
Editor, ADVOCATZ.com
Editor, ADVOCATZ Blog
Editor, NYC Rubber Room Reporter
Editor, Parentadvocates.org
Editor, New York Court Corruption
Editor, National Public Voice
Editor, NYC Public Voice
Editor, Inside 3020-a Teacher Trials 

Appeals court rules that judiciary misspent funds from court records fees

The Hill, BY HARPER NEIDIG - 08/06/20 11:10 AM EDT

A federal appeals court on Thursday ruled that the federal judiciary has been misusing the fees it charges the public for access to court records.

A three-judge panel on the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district court decision that ruled the Administrative Office of the United States Courts had improperly spent money from access fees on programs that had nothing to do with maintaining the public's ability to access court documents.

Judge Todd Hughes wrote in a decision for the panel that the law requires courts to limit the fees charged to access records to "the amount needed to cover expenses incurred in services providing public access to federal court electronic docketing information."

The case concerns a lawsuit brought by legal groups challenging the court system's Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) program, which charges the public 10 cents for every page of a document they access, though documents exceeding 30 pages are capped at $3.

Critics argue that the fees are excessively high.

"We're thrilled that the Federal Circuit recognized that the federal judiciary's PACER system has been charging people more than the law allows for access to court records," said Deepak Gupta, an attorney representing the organizations that filed the lawsuit. "The judiciary's antiquated paywall inhibits ordinary people's access to the courts, prevents journalists from covering what the courts are up to, and makes important academic research difficult or impossible. The next step should be to make access completely free."

A district judge ruled in 2018 that the court system had unlawfully used PACER fees on a study regarding electronic access to Mississippi state court documents, a program sharing information with local law enforcement on violent offenders, and the costs of an electronic juror-management system.

The circuit court upheld those findings, but rejected the plaintiffs' efforts to expand the scope of the decision.

"As to those amici urging the elimination of all fees for accessing electronically available court records, we agree with the government that those calls are better directed to Congress," Hughes wrote in Thursday's ruling.

Tammy Dombeck Wins $215,000 in Age Discrimination Lawsuit Against CBS Stations Group of Texas

I think Tammy looks gorgeous. I'm glad she won and can help CBS Stations Group get their act together on hiring women over the age of 27.

Betsy Combier
betsy.combier@gmail.com
Editor, ADVOCATZ.com
Editor, ADVOCATZ Blog
Editor, NYC Rubber Room Reporter
Editor, Parentadvocates.org
Editor, New York Court Corruption
Editor, National Public Voice
Editor, NYC Public Voice
Editor, Inside 3020-a Teacher Trials 

CBS Stations Group of Texas to pay Tammy Dombeck $215,000

Mikemcduff.com, July 15, 2020

Former CBS11 KTVT Dallas - Fort Worth Metroplex freelance traffic reporter Tammy Dombeck Campbell will be paid $215,000 and furnished "significant equitable relief" to settle a federal age discrimination lawsuit, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has announced.

Here is more from the EEOC press release:

The EEOC charged that CBS violated federal law when it refused to hire Tammy Dombeck Campbell for a full-time traffic reporter position at the Dallas/Fort Worth station because of her age. The EEOC said that Campbell had worked for CBS 11 as a freelance, non-staff traffic reporter.

When the station’s morning full-time traffic reporter resigned in October 2014, the company initiated a search for a replacement. The CBS job announcement stated that “the ideal candidate” would have a strong knowledge of local traffic in the Dallas/Fort Worth area and that the “applicant must have at least five years professional broadcasting experience.” The EEOC said that CBS 11 hired a 24-year-old applicant for the full-time traffic reporter position. The younger applicant was a former NFL cheerleader, and the EEOC maintained that the she did not meet the hiring criteria CBS had advertised. CBS 11 also had made an offer to a 27-year old applicant who accepted and then withdrew from the hiring process.

Such alleged conduct violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), which prohibits discrimination against people age 40 or older. The EEOC filed suit (EEOC v. CBS Stations Group of Texas; Television Station KTXA and KTVT-TV, Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-02624) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, after first attempting to reach a voluntary pre-litigation settlement through its conciliation process.

Under the consent decree signed by U.S. District Chief Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn, resolving the suit, CBS Stations Group of Texas will pay will pay $215,000 to Ms. Campbell and commits not to engage in age discrimination. The company will also provide training on the ADEA, publish a notice of employee rights, and report to the EEOC on its compliance with the requirements of consent decree.

“Tammy Campbell was clearly qualified for the position of traffic reporter,” said Joel Clark, EEOC senior trial attorney for the Dallas District Office. “The EEOC argued to the court that CBS 11 preferred a younger, less qualified applicant, and that the employer defaulted to unfounded stereotypes about female reporters.”

EEOC Regional Attorney Robert A. Canino added, “In explaining its decision, the company relied on what was called the ‘it’ factor. The EEOC was prepared to prove that, for Ms. Campbell, ‘it’ was her age. We hope that the resolution of this case will be another step forward in moving past ageist attitudes that can limit opportunities in the field of broadcast television.”

RELATED
An exclusive interview with former CBS11 traffic anchor Tammy Dombeck and her EEOC attorneys, who are taking the station to court on charges of age discrimination (2017)

According to her bio, Dombeck has covered DFW traffic on the radio for such stations as KLIF, KPLX, KZPS, and KKDA. In addition to TV news traffic on KTVT, she also covered it for NBC 5 KXAS in Dallas for 12 years.

UPDATE JULY 17, 2020
KTVT released a statement on the settlement to the Fort Worth Star-Telegram which said, “We are pleased this matter has been resolved to the satisfaction of all parties.”


The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)

HR DIVE

The ADEA forbids discrimination on the basis of age against employees and applicants who are 40 years old or older. Even though the federal anti-discrimination law has been in place for many years, age discrimination remains a problem in the workplace, experts say. A recent AARP investigation found that ageism at work is widespread; more than a fifth of employees over age 40 in a Hiscox Ageism in the Workplace Study said they had experienced age discrimination in the workplace.

Several employers have settled claims of age bias in hiring recently. Earlier this year, PwC agreed to pay $11.6 million and change its recruiting practices to settle a claim that its targeting of recent college grads amounted to age discrimination. Norfolk Southern Corp., a freight hauler, likewise agreed to pay $350,000 in February to settle an EEOC age discrimination lawsuit alleging the freight transportation company refused to hire qualified individuals over the age of 51 for railway security positions.

Compliance with the ADEA can start with recruitment efforts, stakeholders say. When designing plans that attract a diverse pool of candidates, employers can include age in their inclusion strategies. Avoiding terms such as "established" or "digital native" can help, sources previously told HR Dive. It's worth noting, too, that experts say recruiting heavily based on social media can disproportionately attract younger applicants.

Employers can reduce discriminatory employment decisions in hiring, promotion, and assignment by establishing written criteria tied to business needs for evaluating candidates and consistently applying the requirements to all candidates, the EEOC has said.

Ghislaine Maxwell Charged In Manhattan Federal Court For Conspiring With Jeffrey Epstein To Sexually Abuse Minor

Epstein Confidante Ghislaine Maxwell Arrives in New York City, Bail Hearing Looms

Maxwell is Alleged to Have Facilitated, Participated in Acts of Abuse

                   Additionally Charged With Perjury in Connection With 2016 Depositions

Audrey Strauss, the Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, William F. Sweeney Jr., the Assistant Director-in-Charge of the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and Dermot Shea, Commissioner of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), announced that GHISLANE MAXWELL was arrested this morning and charged with enticing a minor to travel to engage in criminal sexual activity, transporting a minor with the intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, conspiracy to commit both of those offenses, and perjury in connection with a sworn deposition.  The indictment unsealed today alleges that between at least in or about 1994 through 1997, MAXWELL and co-conspirator Jeffrey Epstein exploited girls as young as 14, including by enticing them to travel and transporting them for the purpose of engaging in illegal sex acts.  As alleged, knowing that Epstein had a preference for young girls, MAXWELL played a critical role in the grooming and abuse of minor victims that took place in locations including New York, Florida, and New Mexico.  In addition, as alleged, MAXWELL made several false statements in sworn depositions in 2016.  MAXWELL is expected to be presented this afternoon in the federal court in New Hampshire. This case is assigned to U.S. District Judge Alison J. Nathan.

Acting U.S. Attorney Audrey Strauss said:  “As alleged, Ghislaine Maxwell facilitated, aided, and participated in acts of sexual abuse of minors.  Maxwell enticed minor girls, got them to trust her, and then delivered them into the trap that she and Jeffrey Epstein had set. She pretended to be a woman they could trust.  All the while, she was setting them up to be abused sexually by Epstein and, in some cases, Maxwell herself.  Today, after many years, Ghislaine Maxwell finally stands charged for her role in these crimes.”

FBI Assistant Director William F. Sweeney Jr. said:  “Preserving the innocence of children is among the most important responsibilities we carry as adults.  Like Epstein, Ms. Maxwell chose to blatantly disregard the law and her responsibility as an adult, using whatever means she had at her disposal to lure vulnerable youth into behavior they should never have been exposed to, creating the potential for lasting harm. We know the quest for justice has been met with great disappointment for the victims, and that reliving these events is traumatic. The example set by the women involved has been a powerful one. They persevered against the rich and connected, and they did so without a badge, a gun, or a subpoena - and they stood together. I have no doubt the bravery exhibited by the women involved here has empowered others to speak up about the crimes of which they've been subjected.”

NYPD Commissioner Dermot Shea said:  “The heinous crimes these charges allege are, and always will be abhorrent for the lasting trauma they inflict on victims. I commend our investigators, and law enforcement partners, for their continuing commitment to bringing justice to the survivors of sexual assault, everywhere.”

If you believe you are a victim of the sexual abuse perpetrated by Jeffrey Epstein, please contact the FBI at 1-800-CALL FBI, and reference this case.

According to the Indictment[1] unsealed today in Manhattan federal court:

From at least 1994 through at least 1997, GHISLAINE MAXWELL assisted, facilitated, and participated in Jeffrey Epstein’s abuse of minor girls by, among other things, helping Jeffrey Epstein to recruit, groom, and ultimately abuse victims known to MAXWELL and Epstein to be under the age of 18.  The victims were as young as 14 years old when they were groomed and abused by MAXWELL and Epstein, both of whom knew that their victims were in fact minors.  As a part and in furtherance of their scheme to abuse minor victims, MAXWELL and Epstein enticed and caused minor victims to travel to Epstein’s residences in different states, which MAXWELL knew and intended would result in their grooming for and subjection to sexual abuse.

As alleged, MAXWELL enticed and groomed minor girls to be abused in multiple ways. For example, MAXWELL attempted to befriend certain victims by asking them about their lives, taking them to the movies or taking them on shopping trips, and encouraging their interactions with Epstein.  MAXWELL also acclimated victims to Epstein’s conduct simply by being present for victim interactions with Epstein, which put victims at ease by providing the assurance and comfort of an adult woman who seemingly approved of Epstein’s behavior.  Additionally, to make victims feel indebted to Epstein, MAXWELL would encourage victims to accept offers of financial assistance from Epstein, including offers to pay for travel or educational expenses.  MAXWELL also normalized and facilitated sexual abuse by discussing sexual topics with victims, encouraging them to massage Epstein, and undressing in front of a victim.

As MAXWELL and Epstein intended, these grooming behaviors left minor victims vulnerable and susceptible to sexual abuse by Epstein.  MAXWELL was then present for certain sexual encounters between minor victims and Epstein, such as interactions where a minor victim was undressed, and ultimately MAXWELL was present for sex acts perpetrated by Epstein on minor victims.  That abuse included sexualized massages during which a minor victim was fully or partially nude, as well as group sexualized massages of Epstein involving a minor victim where MAXWELL was present.

As alleged, minor victims were subjected to sexual abuse that included, among other things, the touching of a victim’s breasts or genitals, placing a sex toy such a vibrator on a victim’s genitals, directing a victim to touch Epstein while he masturbated, and directing a victim to touch Epstein’s genitals.  MAXWELL and Epstein’s victims were groomed or abused at Epstein’s residences in New York, Florida, and New Mexico, as well as MAXWELL’s residence in London, England.

Additionally, in 2016, while testifying under oath in a civil proceeding, MAXWELL repeatedly made false statements, including about certain specific acts and events alleged in the Indictment.

*                      *                      *

GHISLAINE MAXWELL, 58, is charged with one count of enticing a minor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison, one count of conspiracy to entice a minor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison, one count of transporting a minor with the intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison, one count of conspiracy to transport a minor with the intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison, and two counts of perjury, each of which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison.

The statutory maximum penalties are prescribed by Congress and are provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant would be determined by the judge.

Ms. Strauss praised the outstanding investigative work of the FBI and the NYPD.

This case is being handled by the Office’s Public Corruption Unit.  Assistant U.S. Attorneys Alex Rossmiller, Alison Moe, and Maurene Comey are in charge of the prosecution.

The charges contained in the Indictment are merely accusations.  The defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.